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  ARTICLE 
CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 
JOSH CHAFETZ† 
 Congress has significantly more constitutional power than we are accus-
tomed to seeing it exercise.  By failing to make effective use of its power, Congress 
has invited the other branches to fill the vacuum, resulting in a constitutional 
imbalance.  This Article considers a number of constitutional tools that individ-
ual houses—and even individual members—of Congress, acting alone, can de-
ploy in interbranch conflicts.  Although the congressional powers discussed in this 
Article are clearly contemplated in constitutional text, history, and structure, 
many of them have received only scant treatment in isolation.  More importantly, 
they have never before been considered in concert as a set of tools in an ongoing 
interbranch power struggle.  This holistic perspective is necessary because these 
powers in combination are much greater than the sum of their parts. 
Borrowing terminology from international relations scholarship, this Arti-
cle groups the congressional powers under discussion into “hard” and “soft” 
varieties.  Congressional hard powers are tangible and coercive; the hard pow-
ers discussed in this Article are the power of the purse and the contempt power.  
Congressional soft powers are intangible and persuasive; soft powers considered 
by this Article include Congress’s freedom of speech and debate, the houses’ dis-
ciplinary power over their own members, and their power to determine the rules 
of their proceedings.  Each of these powers presents opportunities for Congress to 
enhance its standing with the public, and thereby enhance its power.  This Ar-
 
† Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  Thanks to Will Baude, Joseph 
Blocher, Curt Bradley, Sam Buell, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Mike Dorf, Oona Hathaway, 
Marin Levy, David Pozen, Jeff Rachlinski, Aziz Rana, Catherine Roach, Michael Stern, 
Hanah Volokh, Mariah Zeisberg, and the participants in the Duke Law School Legal 
Theory Colloquium for helpful and thought-provoking comments on earlier drafts.  
Ava Jacobi provided outstanding research assistance.  Any remaining errors or infelici-
ties are, of course, my own. 
CHAFETZ REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2012  7:26 PM 
716 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 715 
ticle aims to demonstrate both the ways in which these powers are mutually 
supporting and reinforcing and the ways in which Congress underutilizes 
them.  In doing so, the Article examines a number of examples of congressional 
use of, and failure to use, these powers, including the release of the Pentagon 
Papers, the 1995–1996 government shutdowns and 2011 near-shutdown, the 
2007–2009 contempt-of-Congress proceedings against White House officials, 
and the use of the filibuster, among others. 
The Article concludes by arguing that Congress should make a more vigor-
ous use of these powers and by considering their implications for the separation 
of powers more generally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is commonplace to hear commentators (often, but not always, 
of the conservative persuasion) decry the growth in power of the judi-
ciary over the course of the twentieth- and early-twenty-first centuries.1  
 
1 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 457-63 (2d ed. 1997) (concluding that federal judges 
have impermissibly expanded the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment); ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 130 (1990) 
(“The pace of judicial revision of the Constitution has accelerated over the Court’s his-
tory, as has the exertion of judicial power . . . .”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTI-
TUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 174-76 (1999) (proposing a constitutional amend-
ment that would eliminate judicial review); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous 
Branch:  Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 224 (1994) (“By far, the 
greater problem today is not the too-forceful exercise of presidential power to inter-
pret law, but the too-feeble acquiescence of the executive branch in the courts’ asser-
tion of dominant interpretive power.”); John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War:  
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2005–2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 83, 110-11 (“Hamdan portends 
much more than whether the administration can subject ten or twenty al Qaeda sus-
pects to military commission trial.  It clearly announces that the imperial judiciary re-
spects few limits on how far it is willing to extend its powers of judicial review.”). 
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It is also commonplace to hear commentators (often, but not always, 
of the liberal persuasion) decry the growth in presidential power over 
that same period.2  And there has been no shortage of suggested 
means for curbing the power of these purportedly bloated branches.  
Advocates of limiting judicial power have suggested everything from 
jurisdiction stripping3 to minimalist or highly constrained interpretive 
methods4 to eliminating judicial review entirely.5  Advocates of limit-
ing executive power have suggested everything from inculcating 
 
2 See, e.g., MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 111TH CONG., REIN-
ING IN THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY:  LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE 
PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (Comm. Print 2009) (arguing that executive authori-
ty was misused during the Bush Administration and recommending steps to prevent 
future misuse); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
1-41 (2010) (expressing alarm over the increasing lawlessness of the presidency); 
CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER:  THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUB-
VERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007) (examining ways in which presidential pow-
er expanded during the Bush Administration); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IM-
PERIAL PRESIDENCY 377 (1973) (decrying the “expansion and abuse of Presidential 
power” under Nixon); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship:  
Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1812 (2010) (“The modern President 
is far more powerful, and has far more resources at his disposal, than the Framers 
could possibly have imagined.”); James P. Pfiffner, Constraining Executive Power:  George 
W. Bush and the Constitution, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 123, 139 (2008) (“Even if one 
posits that President Bush has not and would not abuse his executive power, his claim 
to be able to ignore the law, if allowed to stand, would constitute a dangerous prece-
dent . . . .”). 
3 See, e.g., Marriage Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 724, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007) 
(seeking to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over cases pertaining to the interpreta-
tion or constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)); 
Pledge Protection Act of 2005, S. 1046, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005) (seeking to strip 
federal courts of jurisdiction over cases challenging the constitutionality of the Pledge 
of Allegiance or its recitation); John Yoo, Congress to Courts:  ‘Get Out of the War on Ter-
ror,’ WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2006, at A18 (defending the jurisdiction-stripping provisions 
of the Military Commissions Act). 
4 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (2d ed. 1986) (advocating judicial practice of 
the “passive virtues” to avoid deciding certain issues); BORK, supra note 1, at 146 (advo-
cating for the use of an originalist interpretive method because it constrains judges 
and provides a neutral criterion for judgment); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A 
TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3-72 (1999) (arguing that the 
Court should use a minimalist approach and say no more than is necessary to justify 
the outcome in the case before it); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989) (advocating originalism as a means of avoiding “the main 
danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution . . . that the judges will mistake 
their own predilections for the law”). 
5 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 
1346, 1369-1401 (2006) (arguing that disagreements about rights ought to be settled 
by legislatures and not courts). 
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greater degrees of presidential virtue6 to prosecuting executive branch 
officials for abuses of power7 to rewriting Article II of the Constitu-
tion.8  Reading these various proposals, one might be forgiven for la-
menting the absence of a third branch, whose “[a]mbition [might] be 
made to counteract [the] ambition” of the other two.9 
Of course, it wasn’t always thus.  The colonial experience with 
overly powerful executives10 and judges answerable only to a distant 
crown11 led to the creation of almost unfettered legislatures in the ear-
ly Republic.12  After only a decade of experience with such legislatures, 
 
6 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The Virtuous President:  An Essay on Constitutional 
Culture and Conscience 7-12 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“The 
President must possess . . . an active and sensitive constitutional conscience, which 
guides his choices when the law is debatable, and which may at times counsel him that 
certain ways of exercising power, even if not unlawful, are not right.”).  
7 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Liberties and the War Terror, Seven Years After 
9/11 History Repeating:  Due Process, Torture and Privacy During the War on Terror, 62 SMU 
L. REV. 3, 12 (2009) (“[T]his is a strong statement, but I believe that those responsible 
for the rendition camps and torture, especially Dick Cheney, David Addington, Jay 
Bybee, and John Yoo, are war criminals and that there should be an investigation and 
prosecution into their crimes.  I do not choose that language lightly.”); Claire Finkel-
stein & Michael Lewis, Debate, Should Bush Administration Lawyers Be Prosecuted for Au-
thorizing Torture?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 195, 196-204, 215-19 (2010), http:// 
www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/AuthorizingTorture.pdf (Finkelstein, Opening 
and Closing Statements) (arguing that executive branch officials who knowingly en-
courage others to break the law ought to be held criminally liable); Milan Markovic, 
Essay, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 347, 350 (2007) (“Yoo and 
Bybee—and perhaps other lawyers who have or will engage in similar activities—can and 
should be held criminally accountable.”); Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 193, 196-215 (2010) (finding that the actions of the Bush Administration law-
yers who drafted the “torture memos” were sufficient to establish the possibility of ac-
complice liability); Andrew Sullivan, Obama’s First Problem is US War Crimes, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), Nov. 30, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/ 
andrew_sullivan/article5257597.ece (“[T]he evidence we now have, undisputed evi-
dence, proves already that war crimes were indeed committed—by the president and 
vice-president on down. . . . There is, in the end, a simple and sobering truth:  these peo-
ple have to be brought to justice if the rule of law is to survive in America.”). 
8 See, e.g., Garrett Epps, The Ill-Made Prince:  A Modest Proposal for a New Article 
II, at 5 (Aug. 7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1445643 (suggesting that Article II be completely redrafted to “repair the 
dangerous gaps and mistakes” in the current version).  
9 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
10 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 75, 105 (2005) 
(noting the absolute veto possessed by royal governors in the colonies). 
11 See id. at 218 (noting that royal governors, accountable only to the Crown, had 
appointed colonial judges); id. at 221 (noting that colonial judges were “subject to re-
moval at the whim of the executive”).  This undoubtedly explains why so many colonial 
judges sided with the mother country against the rebellious colonies.  See id. at 207.  
12 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, 
at 162-63 (1998) (noting that the revolutionary legislatures were “the heirs to most of 
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Madison, among many others, concluded that “[t]he legislative de-
partment is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and draw-
ing all power into its impetuous vortex.”13  And although fears of both 
an imperial President14 and an overreaching judiciary15 began early, 
there have been periods of American history in which the great consti-
tutional fear was of an overly powerful Congress.16  It is, however, safe to 
say that we are not currently living in such a period—nor have we been 
for some time, nor do we show any signs of moving in that direction. 
If any proof of this fact is needed, consider the closing years of the 
George W. Bush Administration, from January 2007 to January 2009.  
(Indeed, pause first to consider what it means that we tend to tell po-
litical time by presidential administration, rather than by congression-
al term.  For the record, the period under discussion is the 110th 
Congress.)  In the 2006 midterm elections, the Democrats had 
wrested control of both houses from the Republicans, picking up thir-
 
the prerogative powers taken away from the governors by the Revolution” and that 
“[t]he American legislatures, in particular the lower houses of the assemblies, were no 
longer to be merely adjuncts or checks to magisterial power, but were in fact to be the 
government—a revolutionary transformation of political authority”). 
13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 9, at 309 ( J ames Madison).  Hamilton con-
curred.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 9, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The 
tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other has been fully displayed and 
illustrated . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 9, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(“The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb 
the powers, of the other departments has been already more than once suggested.”). 
14 See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS:  THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERA-
TION 196-98 (Vintage Books 2002) (2000) (discussing Jeffersonian efforts to portray 
John Adams as a quasi-monarchist); GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND 
THE CONSTITUTION:  THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 74-76 (2007) 
(noting the 1840 Whig reaction to President Andrew Jackson’s expansive conception 
of executive power).  
15 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS:  THE HISTORIC IMPEACH-
MENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 15-134 (1992) 
(discussing the impeachment and near-conviction of Justice Chase for his partisan rul-
ings); Spencer Roane, Roane’s “Hampden” Essays:  Richmond Enquirer, June 11-22, 1819 
(accusing the Marshall Court of arrogating itself too much power in McCulloch), re-
printed in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 106, 106-54 (Gerald 
Gunther ed., 1969). 
16 In 1930, the eminent legal historian Charles Warren wrote: 
There is a phase in the development of our Federal Constitution, which will 
not be found detailed in any law book or in any American history and which 
deserves the consideration of students of our Governmental workings—the 
sturdy struggle which the Executive of the United States has, throughout our 
National life, been forced to make against Congressional encroachment. 
Charles Warren, Presidential Declarations of Independence, 10 B.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1930).  
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ty House seats and six Senate seats.17  What’s more, they did so without 
losing a single seat that they controlled prior to the election, marking 
the first time in American history that a party successfully defended 
every one of its congressional seats.18  President Bush himself charac-
terized the results as “a thumpin’” for his Republican Party.19  Between 
January 2007 and January 2009, every national opinion poll found a 
net disapproval rating for President Bush of between sixteen and fifty-
six percent.20  That is to say, the most positive poll from Bush’s point 
of view over this two-year period found that 38% approved of the job 
he was doing and 54% disapproved;21 the least positive poll found that 
a mere 22% approved, while 78% disapproved.22  But while this period 
of extreme presidential unpopularity23 coincided with increasing judi-
cial confrontation with the Administration,24 one is hard-pressed to 
think of ways in which Congress became increasingly confrontational.  
Indeed, as we shall see later, in the one minor confrontation between 
the executive and Congress during these two years, Congress declined 
to use many of the tools available to it.25  In short, during a time in 
which the political conditions were maximally favorable to Congress 
and in which both houses were controlled by members of the party 
 
17 Gary C. Jacobson, Referendum:  The 2006 Midterm Congressional Elections, 122 POL. 
SCI. Q. 1, 1 (2007). 
18 Id.  
19 Jill Zuckman, Virginia Holds Key to Control of Senate:  Democrat Leads with GOP 
Ouster on the Line, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 2006, at 1.  
20 See President Bush—Overall Job Rating, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www. 
pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (compiling and reporting 
national opinion polls measuring President Bush’s job approval rating between Sep-
tember 7, 2005, and January 6, 2009).  
21 Id. (citing the FOX/Opinion Dynamics poll conducted on January 30–31, 2007).  
22 Id. (citing the Research 2000 poll conducted on July 25–27, 2008).  
23 See Richard A. Brody, The American People and President George W. Bush:  The Fall, 
the Rise and Fall Again, 6 FORUM, no. 2, 2008, at 1, 15 (“President Bush has been unique 
in the weakness of his level of support.  No other president for whom we have polling 
data has reached and sustained a level of public approval in the low thirties.”).  
24 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding, contrary to 
the position of the Bush Administration, that alien detainees at Guantanamo Bay pos-
sessed the constitutional right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Munaf v. Geren, 
553 U.S. 674, 685-88 (2008) (rejecting the Government’s  argument that federal courts 
lacked the jurisdiction to hear a habeas petition from a U.S. citizen detained by Ameri-
can forces abroad); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-32 (2007) (rejecting the 
arguments of the EPA that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 
Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1194-227 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 
NHTSA’s regulations under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act inadequate and 
remanding to the Administration for new standards). 
25 See infra Section I.B. 
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that did not control the White House, Congress nevertheless played 
the constitutional shrinking violet. 
At this point, the perceptive reader may be asking what, realist- 
ically, Congress could have done.  After all, President Bush still had 
veto power over any legislation meant to check him, and it seems un-
likely that his opponents in Congress could have mustered the votes to 
override a veto.  But to cast congressional power entirely in terms of 
legislation is to significantly understate the scope of Congress’s powers 
under the Constitution.  This Article will highlight a number of ways 
in which individual houses, and even individual members, of Con-
gress, acting alone, can begin to restore some measure of constitu-
tional equipoise. 
To borrow terminology from the international relations literature, 
we can think of these congressional powers as coming in both hard 
and soft varieties.  Hard power is, quite simply, “the ability to coerce.”26  
In the international arena, a nation’s hard power is “usually associated 
with tangible resources like military and economic strength.”27  Soft 
power, by contrast, is “the ability to get what you want through attrac-
tion rather than coercion or payments.”28  In foreign affairs, it “arises 
from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and pol-
icies.  When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, 
our soft power is enhanced.”29  A nation neglects its soft power re-
sources at its own peril in the international sphere.30 
An institution neglects its soft power resources in the domestic 
sphere at its own peril as well.  In many cases, the American Constitu-
tion deliberately “leaves not simply the resolution of substantive issues, 
but also the resolution of the meta-question as to the proper site of 
 
26 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 255, 
256 (2004).  
27 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., BOUND TO LEAD:  THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN 
POWER 32 (1990).  
28 Nye, supra note 26, at 256.  
29 Id.; see also NYE, supra note 27, at 32 (associating soft power with “intangible 
power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions”).  
30 See Nye, supra note 26, at 257 (“It is not smart to discount soft power as just a ques-
tion of image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity. . . . [I]t is a form of power . . . . 
When we discount the importance of our attractiveness to other countries, we pay a 
price.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief ? , 81 IND. L.J. 
1145, 1153 n.38 (2006) (“[W]e cannot accomplish our goals [in the War on Terror] 
without diplomacy and international law—soft power tools that were developed precisely 
so that countries would not have to rely exclusively on force all the time.”). 
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resolution for those issues, to constitutional politics.”31  In doing so, it 
embodies a judgment that government will be better when the consti-
tutional structure creates the opportunity for interbranch tension and 
conflict.32  This space for conflict allows the branches to compete pub-
licly for the affections of the people in a manner that increases repre-
sentativeness, reduces the risk of one branch asserting tyrannical con-
trol over the nation, and promotes healthy deliberation as to the 
public good.33  Part of that process of competition must involve a de-
liberative engagement with the citizenry—that is, each branch must 
make its case in the public sphere.34  And this is where each branch’s 
soft power must come into play.  A branch that consistently loses the 
public relations war will find itself consistently losing power.35 
 
31 Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 
1084, 1113 (2011) (book review).  
32 Cf. Mariah Zeisberg, The Relational Conception of War Powers (describing a “rela-
tional account” of the war powers that is “premised on the value of maintaining the 
branches in relationships of mutual review, even when that review leads to interbranch 
interpretive conflict”), in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 168, 169 
( Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2010). 
33 See Chafetz, supra note 31, at 1112-28.  
34 In this context, “making its case” involves more than simply pandering to cur-
rent public opinion.  In many situations, it requires an active attempt to persuade—to 
lead and shape public opinion.  See DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS:  ACTIONS 
IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES MADISON THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH 14-19 (2000) (argu-
ing that political preferences are largely endogenous to politics and that therefore po-
litical figures in the public sphere are involved in both opinion expression and opinion 
formation).  
35 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work:  The Yale Lectures, 120 YALE 
L.J. 1999, 1999 (2011) (“[I]n a democracy public support for any public institution is 
necessary.  Without it the institution may wither, perhaps die.”); Eric A. Posner & Adri-
an Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1006 (2008) (noting 
that, in an interbranch conflict, “through the mysterious process by which public opin-
ion forms, the public will throw its weight behind one branch or the other, and the 
branch that receives public support will prevail”); Douglas Rivers & Nancy L. Rose, 
Passing the President’s Program:  Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress, 29 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 183, 194 (1985) (finding that “public opinion is an important source of 
presidential influence in Congress”). 
 To take just one example, it is clearly the case that an unpopular President—that 
is, one who has been doing badly on the public relations front—will face more Senate 
opposition to his judicial nominations than a popular President.  See GEORGE L. WAT-
SON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA:  THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT AP-
POINTMENTS 88-89 (1995).  That is to say, a President who has lost the support of the 
public cannot expect deference in this area; rather, the Senate will be more assertive in 
its demands to exercise power.  And this can be true even when the same party con-
trols both the Senate and the Presidency, as demonstrated by President Bush’s failed 
nomination of Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court in 2005.  See JAN CRAWFORD 
GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT:  THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 
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The remainder of this Article, then, will be devoted to tracing 
those powers—both hard and soft—that individual houses, and even 
individual members, can use in interbranch conflicts.  Many of these 
powers have received only scant treatment in isolation; they have nev-
er before been grouped and conceptualized as a set of tools in an on-
going power struggle between the branches.36  This is an essential 
point, for these powers taken together are more than the sum of their 
parts.  If viewed in isolation, some will appear too weak; others will 
appear so strong that it is hard to imagine Congress resorting to them 
with any frequency; still others will appear easily evadable by the other 
branches.  But if these powers are viewed as mutually reinforcing, 
then it becomes clear that Congress has a range of options from which 
to select the appropriate tools to deal with any separation-of-powers 
controversy.  My claim, then, is not that I have unearthed a set of con-
gressional powers of which we have previously been unaware.  Although 
some of the powers discussed below will seem somewhat exotic, others 
are quite familiar.  My thesis, rather, is that they have not adequately 
been viewed as pieces of an interlocking set of powers to be exercised 
by the First Branch in defense of its constitutional position.  Clearly, 
not all of the powers below will be appropriate in any given circum-
stance, and my discussion should not be taken as an endorsement of 
their indiscriminate use.  But I aim to show that they have been sys-
tematically underused or misused in a way that tends to diminish 
Congress’s power vis-à-vis the other branches. 
Part I will focus on two congressional “hard powers”:  the power of 
the purse and the contempt power.  There are, of course, other con-
gressional hard powers—two examples that immediately spring to 
mind are the impeachment power (which admittedly requires the par-
ticipation of both houses,37 but not any other branch38) and the Sen-
 
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 263-84 (2007) (describing the controversy 
over the Miers nomination). 
36 Adrian Vermeule has considered a suite of congressional procedure issues in 
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
361 (2004).  His focus, however, is not primarily on their separation-of-powers implica-
tions, but rather on comparing the rules laid out in the Constitution with those pro-
duced by a positive political theory of ideal institutional design.  See id. at 363.  Perhaps 
as a result of our distinct purposes, Vermeule also focuses on an almost completely dif-
ferent set of procedures than I do here. 
37 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have 
the sole Power of Impeachment.”); id. § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power 
to try all Impeachments.”). 
38 In cases of presidential impeachment only, the Chief Justice presides over the 
Senate trial.  See id. § 3, cl. 6.  But the Chief Justice does not vote, and any rulings he 
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ate’s power to advise on and consent to the appointment of federal 
judges and principal executive branch officers.39  But hard powers 
tend to be more familiar than soft powers, so this Part will aim for 
economy in presentation.  The analytic points made within this Part, 
however, should prove readily applicable to other congressional hard 
powers as well. 
Part II will focus on the less familiar realm of congressional “soft 
powers”—that is, constitutional tools that enhance Congress’s ability 
to compete for the affections of the public, thereby (if used wisely) 
enhancing its power vis-à-vis the other branches.  Specifically, this Part 
will analyze the freedom of legislative speech and debate, the houses’ 
disciplinary powers over their own members, and the houses’ power to 
determine their own rules of proceedings.40  These powers tend to re-
ceive very little attention, and my aim in this Part will be to demon-
strate that their potential as a power source for Congress has been 
significantly underestimated and therefore squandered. 
It is worth noting that all five of the powers discussed here are 
clearly contemplated in constitutional text, history, and structure.  
These are not powers that Congress has questionably arrogated to it-
self.  Precisely the opposite, in fact—they are powers allocated to 
Congress by the Constitution that Congress has nevertheless systemat-
ically underutilized. 
Part III will draw these themes together into a normative vision of 
Congress’s place within the constitutional order. 
 
makes from the chair can be overridden by a majority of Senators.  See RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE SENATE WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACHMENT TRIALS, at R. 
VII, in COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., U.S. SENATE, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE 
STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE 
U.S. SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-1, at 207, 208-09 (2008).  The involvement of the judici-
ary in impeachments is thus de minimis. 
39 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President,] by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other [principal] Officers of the United 
States . . . .”).  
40 Again, this list is not meant to be exhaustive, and the analyses in this Part may 
fruitfully be applied to other congressional soft powers.  For example, to the extent 
that congressional resolutions—either one-house or concurrent—make an argument 
to the public, they are exercises of congressional soft power.  See, e.g., S. Res. 10, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (recognizing Israel’s right “to defend itself against attacks from Gaza” 
and reaffirming American “support for Israel in its battle with Hamas”); H.R. Res. 32, 
110th Cong. (2007) (denouncing various forms of gender-based persecution).  These 
and other uses of congressional resolutions are discussed thoroughly in Jacob E. 
Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law:  Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
573 (2008).  Accordingly, I have chosen to focus on other examples of soft power here.  
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I.  HARD POWER 
A.  The Power of the Purse 
It may appear odd to begin by discussing the power of the purse, 
given my claim above that I will focus on mechanisms that are available 
to individual houses or members.  After all, the power of the purse is 
exercised via legislation,41 which requires both bicameralism and pre-
sentment.42  But notice the converse of this fact:  if directing money to be 
spent requires the concurrence of the House, the Senate, and the Pres-
ident (or sufficiently large House and Senate supermajorities43), then 
either the House or the Senate, acting alone, can withhold money.  Of 
course, this is true of any bill—the House and Senate are each absolute 
vetogates to the passage of legislation.44  But appropriations laws are dif-
ferent in that their passage is necessary to the continued functioning of 
the entire government.  The annual budget process guarantees that, 
every year, each house of Congress has the opportunity to give mean-
ingful voice to its priorities and its discontentments. 
 
41 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”).  
42 See id. § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President . . . .”).  
43 See id. (providing that a two-thirds vote in each house can override a presi-
dential veto).  
44 I refer to them as absolute vetogates because Professor Eskridge, among others, 
has used the term “vetogates” somewhat more promiscuously.  See William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444-48 (2008) (in-
cluding, inter alia, substantive congressional committees, the House Rules Committee, 
and conference committees on the list of vetogates).  Although the “vetogates” on 
Eskridge’s expanded list are undoubtedly serious choke points for legislation, most of 
them can be—and occasionally are—evaded.  For example, substantive committees can 
be circumvented in the House by discharge petitions and in the Senate by introducing 
legislation directly onto the floor or introducing it as a floor amendment to another 
bill.  See CQ PRESS, HOW CONGRESS WORKS 86-87 (4th ed. 2008) (describing discharge 
petitions); id. at 108 (describing the use of nongermane amendments to “wrest bills 
out of reluctant committees” in the Senate); see also CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA 
WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE:  A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT 132-35 (1985) (describing how the 1964 Civil Rights Act was introduced directly 
onto the Senate floor in order to avoid getting bogged down in the Judiciary Commit-
tee).  Or consider the 2010 health care reform law, which avoided conference commit-
tee.  See STAFF OF THE WASH. POST, LANDMARK:  THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW 
HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 49-62 (2010) (describing the con-
gressional maneuvering designed to avoid conference committee on the bill).  Bicam-
eralism, on the other hand, is a hard-wired constitutional requirement; I therefore re-
fer to it as an “absolute vetogate.” 
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Annual legislative appropriations have their roots in English par-
liamentary practice, and specifically in the Glorious Revolution.  
Theretofore, it had been standard practice for Parliament, upon the 
ascension of a new Monarch, to grant him or her certain revenues for 
life; the combination of these revenues, the Monarch’s own feudal 
dues, and the occasional resort to unconstitutional prerogative taxa-
tion allowed the Stuarts to rule without Parliament for long stretches 
of time.45  A large part of Parliament’s goal in stitching together the 
Revolution Settlement was to ensure that Monarchs would no longer 
feel free to rule without Parliament.  Two elements of that settlement 
are worth noting here.  First, in Trevelyan’s words: 
[T]he Commons took good care that after the Revolution the Crown 
should be altogether unable to pay its way without an annual meeting of 
Parliament.  William had no large grant made him for life.  Every year he 
and his Ministers had to come, cap in hand, to the House of Commons, 
and more often than not the Commons drove a bargain and exacted a 
quid pro quo in return for supply.
46
 
That is to say, appropriations were made into an annual affair.  And se-
cond, Parliament passed the Mutiny Act,47 which created a criminal of-
fense of mutiny from the army,48 but provided that the penalties would 
sunset within a year.49  The Monarchs would thus be forced to disband 
the standing army, to call an annual Parliament, or, if they did neither 
of those, to risk soldiers deserting without fear of consequence.  If 
they chose either to disband the army or to call a Parliament, then 
they would be adequately constrained in their exercise of power.  
What both of these elements of the Revolution Settlement have in 
common is their creation of an annual baseline.  They did not require 
the Monarch to call regular Parliaments, but they made it very difficult 
for the Monarch to exercise power without the aid of Parliament. 
 
45 See Doris M. Gill, The Treasury, 1660–1714, 46 ENG. HIST. REV. 600, 610 (1931) 
(“Charles II and James II were granted a revenue for life on their accession, so that it 
was only necessary for the king to apply to parliament to supply deficiencies in his in-
come and to cover war expenses.”).  On the tendency of the early Stuarts to resort to 
prerogative taxation, see Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1083, 1100-16 (2009). 
46 G.M. TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1688–1689, at 96 (1977).  
47 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 5 (Eng.). 
48 Id. § 2.  
49 See id. § 8 (providing that the Act would continue in effect until November 10, 
1689, “and noe longer”). 
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The U.S. Constitution, of course, requires that Congress assemble 
at least once per year,50 and it specifies that “no Appropriation of 
Money” for the purpose of “rais[ing] and support[ing] Armies . . . 
shall be for a longer Term than two Years,”51 but it does not otherwise 
limit the duration of appropriations.52  Nevertheless, the practice from 
the beginning of the Republic has been one of annual appropriations.  
The nation’s very first appropriations bill authorized the expenditure 
of sums not exceeding $639,000 “for the service of the present year.”53  
Subsequent early appropriations bills followed suit.54 
Annual appropriations serve the same function as sunset provi-
sions in substantive legislation:  both reset the legislative baseline.55  
Consider the following simple example:  At time t1, Congress passes a 
law delegating a certain amount of power to an administrative agency.  
If that law has no sunset provision, then, in order to take that power 
back at time t2, Congress would need to pass a second law—which, of 
course, would require either presidential concurrence or two-thirds 
supermajorities in both chambers.56  But the t1 law empowers executive 
branch actors (i.e., the administrative agency) and thereby empowers 
the President, so it is unlikely that the President would consent to giv-
ing that power back.  Under this scenario, Congress is likely stuck with 
the t1 law.  But now imagine that Congress had included a sunset pro-
vision, so that at t2, the delegation ceases to have any legal force.  Inac-
 
50 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2; id. amend. XX, § 2. 
51 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
52 It is worth noting that, like the English Mutiny Act, the American Constitution is 
concerned specifically with armies, not navies.  Compare id. (placing a time limit on ap-
propriations to “raise and support Armies”), with id. cl. 13 (placing no time limit on 
appropriations to “provide and maintain a Navy”).  Indeed, so is the Third Amend-
ment, which forbids the nonconsensual peacetime quartering of “Soldier[s],” not sail-
ors.  Id. amend. III.  The reason is that standing armies were perceived as a threat to 
domestic liberties; an ambitious executive could use the army to oppress the people.  
In contrast, the navy was traditionally seen, in Blackstone’s words, as “the floating bul-
wark of the island . . . from which, however strong and powerful, no danger can ever 
be apprehended to liberty.”  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405.  Strong 
legislative checks on the executive’s most dangerous tendencies is the common theme. 
53 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95, 95.  
54 See, e.g., Act of Dec. 23, 1791, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 226, 226; Act of Feb. 11, 1791, ch. 6, 1 
Stat. 190, 190; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 104, 104; Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 
1 Stat. 95, 95. 
55 Rebecca Kysar has recently attacked sunset provisions on a number of fronts.  
See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1051-65 (2011).  The 
merits of Kysar’s particular attacks are beyond the scope of this Article, but it should be 
noted that none of her arguments address the separation-of-powers implications of 
sunset provisions, which are my focus here. 
56 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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tion now favors congressional power; only if the House, Senate, and 
President once again agree to delegate the power will the executive be 
able to exercise it at t2.  This, of course, is precisely why Parliament in 
1689 included a sunset clause in the Mutiny Act,57 and it is why Con-
gress in 2001 included a sunset provision in the PATRIOT Act.58  (It 
also explains why the Bush Administration opposed the PATRIOT 
Act’s sunset provision.59) 
An appropriations provision is simply a delegation of spending au-
thority.  A long-term or indefinite appropriation significantly increases 
executive power.  So long as the President is happy with the appropria-
tion, he need only veto any attempt to change it.  An annual appropria-
tion, however, resets to zero in the absence of congressional action and 
thereby forces the President to negotiate with Congress each year.  
Thus, the larger the percentage of the budget that is subject to annual 
appropriations, the more bargaining chips Congress has at its disposal. 
It is, then, interesting to note that the percentage of the federal 
budget subject to annual appropriations has been steadily declining 
for some time.  The federal budget consists of two essential compo-
nents:  mandatory spending and discretionary spending.  Mandatory 
spending (also called “direct spending”) “involves a binding legal ob-
ligation by the Federal Government to provide funding for an indi-
vidual, program, or activity.”60  Once mandatory spending has been 
authorized, “eligible recipients have legal recourse to compel payment 
from the government if the obligation is not fulfilled.”61  Mandatory 
spending is precisely that spending that does not require annual ap-
propriations.  It is authorized in perpetuity, unless a new law is passed 
revoking it.  The major elements of mandatory spending are entitle-
ments62 and interest payments on debt.63  All other spending—
 
57 See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.  
58 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, § 224(a), 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001) (“[T]his title and the amendments 
made by this title . . . shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005.”). 
59 See Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks:  The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1172, 1178-79 (2004) (noting that the Bush Administration pre-
ferred a bill lacking a sunset clause).  
60 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 105TH CONG., THE CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET PROCESS:  AN EXPLANATION 5 (Comm. Print 1998); see also ALLEN SCHICK, 
THE FEDERAL BUDGET:  POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 57 (3d ed. 2007) (“Direct spend-
ing is not controlled by annual appropriations but by the legislation that establishes 
eligibility criteria and payment formulas, or otherwise obligates the government.”). 
61 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 60, at 5. 
62 Id. at 5-6.  
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including the funding for all federal agencies—is discretionary64 and 
requires annual appropriations.  For the 2010 fiscal year, sixty-one 
percent of the federal budget consisted of mandatory spending,65 re-
flecting a long-running trend of growth in the percentage of the fed-
eral budget devoted to mandatory spending.66  In other words, for six-
ty-one percent of the federal budget, Congress has ceded the 
institutional advantage of annual appropriations67 and surrendered 
the gains of 1689. 
Moreover, even in the realm of discretionary spending, Congress 
has ceded the first-mover advantage to the President.  Under the 1921 
Budget and Accounting Act,68 the President kicks off the annual ap-
propriations process by submitting a budget proposal to Congress.69  
Of course, Congress can—and does—depart from the President’s 
proposal in numerous ways, but it is nevertheless the President’s pro-
posal that serves as the starting point for negotiation, and therefore 
exerts a disproportionate impact on the subsequent process.70 
Finally, Congress has shown itself unwilling to take full advantage 
of its power over discretionary spending.  As Charles Black famously 
noted, “[B]y simple majorities, Congress could . . . reduce the presi-
dent’s staff to one secretary for answering social correspondence, 
and . . . , by two-thirds majorities, Congress could put the White 
 
63 See id. at 56 (listing “Social Security, Medicare, veterans’ pensions, rehabilitation 
services, Members’ pay, judges’ pay and the payment of interest of the public debt” as 
examples of mandatory spending). 
64
See id. at 6 (“Most of the actual operations of the Federal Government are fund-
ed by discretionary spending.”).  
65 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 
2012:  HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 145 tbl.8.1 (2010) (re-
cording that, for fiscal year 2010, total spending was $3.5 trillion, of which $2.1 trillion 
went to mandatory spending and net interest).  
66 See Robert C. Byrd, Policy Essay, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 
35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 314 (1998) (noting the considerable growth in mandatory 
spending since the 1960s).  
67 See Alan L. Feld, The Shrunken Power of the Purse, 89 B.U. L. REV. 487, 492 (2009) 
(noting that the prevalence of “permanent fiscal legislation limits Congress’s ability to 
review and change priorities through the appropriation process”). 
68 Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
31 U.S.C.).  
69 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2006) (“On or after the first Monday in January but not 
later than the first Monday in February of each year, the President shall submit a 
budget of the United States Government for the following fiscal year.”).  
70 See Gersen & Posner, supra note 40, at 589 (noting the “first-mover advantage 
[that] . . . accrues from the President’s ability to propose an initial budget”); see also 
SCHICK, supra note 60, at 14 (suggesting that the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act 
ushered in an era of “presidential dominance” of the budget process). 
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House up at auction.”71  Along the same lines, Congress could presum-
ably eliminate the salaries of judicial clerks and secretaries or even 
(most cruelly of all) cut the Supreme Court’s air conditioning budget.72  
Why do we so seldom see even more modest versions of this behavior?  
After all, refusing to pay the salaries of Crown officers and judges was 
a venerable tradition in the American colonies.73  The President him-
self,74 like federal judges,75 is protected against salary diminution, but 
the Constitution provides no other government official such protec-
tion.  And yet, even when Congress is willing to hold executive branch 
officers in contempt—as it did with Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten 
during the Bush Administration76—it has not used its power of the 
purse as a means of indicating its disapproval. 
Of course, perhaps Professor Black was wrong—perhaps simple 
majorities could not reduce the President’s staff to a single social sec-
retary because the President would veto any such budget.  There 
would be an element of perversity in that:  by doing so, the President 
would shut down the government, thereby reducing his staff to zero.77  
 
71 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 15 (1974).  
72 Mike Dorf, who suggested the air conditioning hypothetical in conversation, is 
also the source of the hypothetical about cutting the salaries of judicial staff.  See Mi-
chael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 331 (2007).  Dorf raises the possi-
bility that such cuts would be an unconstitutional violation of a structural principle of 
judicial independence, but he does not take a position on the question.  See id. at 331-32. 
73 See Chafetz, supra note 45, at 1122-23 (giving examples of colonial legislatures 
withholding the salaries of Crown officials in order to express dissatisfaction).  
74 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall . . . receive for his Services, 
a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period 
for which he shall have been elected . . . .”). 
75 See id. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts . . . shall . . . receive for the Services, a Compensation, which shall not be dimin-
ished during their Continuance in Office.”). 
76 See Chafetz, supra note 45, at 1086-93 (discussing the contempt of Congress 
proceedings against Miers and Bolten).  
77 Not entirely.  “Essential” government personnel continue to report for work, 
even during government “shutdowns,” although they cannot be paid until the gov-
ernment reopens.  See Auth. for the Continuance of Gov’t Functions During a Temp. 
Lapse in Appropriations, 5 Op. O.L.C. 1, 11-12 (1981) (noting that, even during a 
shutdown, the executive branch possesses “leeway to perform essential functions and 
make the government ‘workable’”).  But this leeway is rather tightly constrained.  See 
Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) (“An officer or employee of the United 
States Government or of the District of Columbia government may not accept voluntary 
services for either government or employ personal services exceeding that authorized by 
law except for emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of prop-
erty.”); Auth. to Employ the Servs. of White House Office Emps. During an Appropria-
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But he would be banking on winning the ensuing public relations 
struggle, thereby forcing Congress (eventually) to back down and re-
store his full staff.  Perhaps a President would even be willing to veto 
an appropriations bill simply because it zeroed-out the salary of one of 
his favored subordinates.  After all, in 1995 and 1996, the federal gov-
ernment shut down twice—once for less than a week and then again 
for three weeks—when President Clinton and the Republican-
controlled Congress (led by Speaker Newt Gingrich) were unable to 
agree on a budget.78  While Congress was the clear institutional loser 
in the 1995–1996 government shutdowns,79 it would be a mistake to 
infer from this single example that Congress inevitably loses out in 
government shutdowns.80  The lesson of 1995–1996 was, rather, that a 
government shutdown throws interbranch conflict into sharp relief, 
increasing the public salience—and therefore the political stakes—of 
the fight.  This dynamic presents both opportunities and pitfalls for 
Congress and the President alike.  As one historian of the 1995–1996 
shutdowns wrote, “It was a high-risk gamble for both sides.  No one 
really knew how the public would react.”81  Indeed, news accounts dur-
ing the shutdowns made it clear that the President was at risk both of 
losing in the public arena and of losing enough Democratic votes in 
 
tions Lapse, 19 Op. O.L.C. 235, 235 (1995) (discussing the limits of “emergencies involv-
ing an imminent threat to the safety of human life or the protection of property”). 
78 See generally ELIZABETH DREW, SHOWDOWN:  THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GIN-
GRICH CONGRESS AND THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE 330-41, 355-67 (1996) (describing 
the shutdowns); SHARON S. GRESSLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-844GOV, SHUTDOWN 
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:  CAUSES, EFFECTS, AND PROCESS 2-3 (2001) (same). 
79 See Richard S. Conley, President Clinton and the Republican Congress, 1995–2000:  
Political and Policy Dimensions of Veto Politics in Divided Government, 31 CONGRESS & PRES-
IDENCY 133, 151 (2004) (“By early January 1996 it became clear that the public was be-
ginning to ascribe far greater blame to the Congress than to the president for the poli-
cy confrontation and stalemate.”). 
80 It would, nevertheless, be a common mistake.  See, e.g., Chris McGreal, Midterms 
2010:  Lessons of 1994, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 4, 2010, at 13 (suggesting, based on the 
evidence of the 1995 shutdown alone and without regard to context, that the President 
enjoys a significant advantage in a budget shutdown); Steve Benen, Norquist Thinks the 
GOP Will Win from Another Shutdown, WASH. MONTHLY POL. ANIMAL BLOG (Nov. 19, 2010, 
11:30 AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2010_11/ 
026718.php (noting that some Republicans “seriously believe that the public would credit 
Republicans for shutting down the government” and asking “whether Republican leaders 
are crazy enough to think this is a good idea”); Joseph Lazzaro, The Looming Springtime 
Shutdown of the U.S. Government, DAILYFINANCE (Feb. 20, 2011, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/02/20/looming-springtime-governmentshutdown 
(suggesting that “history” teaches that Congress will lose the public opinion battle over 
a government shutdown). 
81 STEVEN M. GILLON, THE PACT:  BILL CLINTON, NEWT GINGRICH, AND THE RIVAL-
RY THAT DEFINED A GENERATION 159 (2008).  
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Congress that his veto could no longer be sustained.82  But, as several 
commentators have noted, Gingrich made both tactical mistakes—
such as personalizing the fight and thereby appearing petty83—and 
strategic ones—such as overreading his mandate to press for conserva-
tive fiscal policy.84  Had he been more skilled, or had Clinton been less 
so, we might well remember the 1995–1996 budget showdown as the 
moment at which the separation-of-powers pendulum began swinging 
back toward Congress.  But to the extent that Congress internalizes 
the narrative that it is bound to lose any budget showdown with the 
White House, it correspondingly lessens its bargaining power. 
Indeed, the House of Representatives’ behavior in the days and 
hours leading up to a near-shutdown in 2011 reveals something more 
of the full extent of each house’s power of the purse.  The 2010 elec-
tion had been a good one for the Republican Party, giving it control 
of the House by a comfortable margin and significantly narrowing the 
margin in the Senate.85  In an echo of President Bush’s admission that 
the 2006 elections were a “thumpin’” for Republicans,86 President 
Obama called the 2010 elections a “shellacking” for Democrats.87  
 
82 See Ann Devroy & Eric Pianin, Talks on 7-Year Balanced Budget ‘Goal’ Collapse, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1995, at A1 (discussing the President’s slipping public approval 
ratings and the mounting pressure from House Democrats who “urg[ed] passage of a 
new continuing resolution and instruct[ed] the President to work with Congress to 
develop a seven-year balanced budget ‘without preconditions’”); Todd S. Purdum, Pres-
ident and G.O.P. Agree to End Federal Shutdown and to Negotiate a Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
20, 1995, at A1 (stating that, “[w]hile early public opinion polls” favored the President, 
“[t]he consensus on Capitol Hill was that Mr. Clinton would have had a hard time sus-
taining a veto if Democrats were given another chance to vote on” “a stopgap spending 
measure . . . that . . . included the goal of balancing the budget in seven years”).  
83 During the shutdown, Gingrich publicly complained about the seating ar-
rangements for a flight on Air Force One.  GILLON, supra note 81, at 160.  As Gillon 
notes, “Gingrich’s childish verbal tirade was a public relations disaster for the Republi-
cans.  Coming in the second day of the shutdown when public opinion was still malle-
able, it made the Republicans seem petulant and stubborn . . . .”  Id. 
84 See id. at 170 (“Gingrich could have declared victory at a number of points [dur-
ing budget negotiations] . . . . [But] Gingrich misinterpreted the results of the 1994 
election and oversold the revolution.”); Conley, supra note 79, at 151 (“[T]he Republi-
can leadership had overestimated support for the Contract [with America] following the 
1994 elections . . . .”).  
85 See Carl Hulse, Taking Control, G.O.P. Overhauls Rules in House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2011, at A1 (noting that sixty-three House seats switched from Democratic to Republi-
can control, giving the Republicans a 242-to-193 edge, and that six Senate seats shifted 
from Democratic to Republican control, leaving the Democrats with a slim 53-to-47 
margin in that chamber).  
86 See supra text accompanying note 19.  
87 Peter Baker & Carl Hulse, The Great Divide:  Obama and G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
4, 2010, at A1.  
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House Republicans, led by Speaker John Boehner, claimed a mandate 
for a decidedly more conservative agenda than had predominated 
over the previous two years.88  Because no budget for Fiscal Year 2011 
had ever been completed, the government was being funded by a se-
ries of short-term continuing resolutions.89  This meant that the new 
Republican House majority had an early crack at the budget. 
By credibly threatening to allow the government to shut down, the 
House Republican leadership was able to bargain for a great deal of 
what it wanted.90  Not only did House Republicans successfully negoti-
ate for over $38 billion in spending cuts that were opposed by the 
White House,91 they also used their budget power as leverage to 
achieve changes they sought in areas as diverse as environmental law,92 
education policy,93 and abortion access.94  They even took the oppor-
tunity to intervene in a separation-of-powers controversy, prohibiting 
the expenditure of funds for certain White House “czars.”95  Whether 
or not one agrees with all (or, indeed, any) of these policy positions, it 
 
88 See Peter Baker, Washington Worries About Its New Power Couple, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 2010, at A24.  
89 See Further Additional Continuing Appropriations Amendments, 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 112-8, 125 Stat. 34; Additional Continuing Appropriations Amendments, 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 112-6, 125 Stat. 23; Further Continuing Appropriations Amendments, 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 112-4, 125 Stat. 6; Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Exten-
sion Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-322, 124 Stat. 3518 (2010); Act of Dec. 18, 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-317, 124 Stat. 3454; Act of Dec. 4, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-290, 124 Stat. 3063; Con-
tinuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-242, 124 Stat. 2607 (2010). 
90 The final budget deal is embodied in Department of Defense and Full-Year 
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38.  
91 Jennifer Steinhauer, 2011 Budget Bill with Cuts Is Approved by Congress, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 15, 2011, at A1.  
92 See Felicity Barringer & John M. Broder, Congress, in a First, Removes an Animal 
from the Endangered Species List, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2011, at A16 (“A rider to the Con-
gressional budget measure . . . dictates that wolves in Montana and Idaho be taken off 
the endangered species list . . . . The rider is the first known instance of Congress’ di-
rectly intervening in the list.”). 
93 See Trip Gabriel, Budget Deal Fuels Revival of School Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 
2011, at A18 (noting that the budget deal included a provision financing school 
vouchers in Washington, D.C.).  
94 See Editorial, The Crisis Next Time, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2011, at A24 (noting that 
a provision in the budget deal prohibits the District of Columbia from spending any 
public money on abortion provision). 
95 See James Risen, Obama Takes on Congress over Policy Czar Positions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 17, 2011, at A17.  In a signing statement, President Obama suggested that this 
provision of the budget law may be an unconstitutional infringement of his inherent 
Article II powers.  See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense and Full-Year 
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 263 (Apr. 15, 
2011).  On the separation-of-powers tussle over “policy czars,” see generally Kevin 
Sholette, Note, The American Czars, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2010). 
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is clear that the House in this instance used its power of the purse as a 
potent weapon in interbranch struggle. 
My aim in this Section is not to advocate a rush to shut down the 
government—or even to threaten to do so—over every interbranch 
spat.  Nor do I advocate a slashing of entitlement spending or a prof-
ligate zeroing-out of executive branch salaries.  Each of these, of 
course, comes with significant costs, and Congress would undermine 
rather than enhance its power if it used them irresponsibly.  But to the 
extent that Congress is unwilling to return to a budget process in 
which annual appropriations predominate,96 to threaten the liveli-
hood of executive officials, or to shut down the government, then it 
must recognize that it has ceded significant power to the executive 
branch.97  Conversely, to the extent that it is willing to do these things, 
it can regain some portion of that power.  As the 2011 budget negotia-
tions have shown, a credible willingness to use these tools need not 
lead to their frequent use—but it does mean that interbranch con-
flicts are negotiated in their shadow.98  Moreover, as the 2011 budget 
negotiations showed, a Congress inclined to use the power of the 
purse robustly would use the appropriations power as leverage in sub-
stantive matters other than appropriations,99 much as the post-
Revolution Parliament exacted concessions in exchange for granting 
 
96 Indeed, some have even proposed moving to a biennial cycle for discretionary 
spending.  See Marcus K. Garner, Isakson Pitches Biennial Budget, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Apr. 16, 2011, at A4 (“Isakson, Democratic co-sponsor Sen. Jeanne Shaheen of New 
Hampshire and a growing list of co-sponsors want Congress to pass a budget every two 
years, rather than every year.  Despite a long history of indifference, the idea appears 
to be gaining support in key committees.”).  Needless to say, this would further reduce 
Congress’s ability to use the power of the purse in pursuit of its goals. 
97 Kate Stith has even suggested that such a hands-off approach to the budget on 
the part of Congress may be unconstitutional.  See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 
97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1345-46 (1988) (“Congress abdicates, rather than exercises, its pow-
er of the purse if it creates permanent or other open-ended spending authority that 
effectively escapes periodic legislative review and limitation.  Accordingly, I propose 
that not every legislative grant of spending authority necessarily qualifies as an ‘Appro-
priation[] made by Law’ under the Constitution.” (alteration in original)).  Whether 
such congressional abdication is unconstitutional or not, it clearly does represent a 
less-than-emphatic use of Congress’s constitutional powers. 
98 Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979) (noting that law serves largely to 
structure bargaining that takes place outside of the courtroom).  
99 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution:  
Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 510 (2011) (arguing that 
Congress should vigorously employ its power of the purse to check presidential unilat-
eralism in warmaking). 
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supply to the Crown.100  Few actions would give teeth to a congression-
al demand, a congressional desire for action, or even a congressional 
finding of contempt quite like a credible threat to withhold funds. 
B.  Contempt 
This brings us to our second congressional hard power:  a con-
tempt of Congress citation.  Although there is no explicit textual 
grounding for holding nonmembers in contempt, each house of 
Congress has been understood to possess this power since the earliest 
days of the Republic.101  Indeed, the contempt power has a long pedi-
gree in English constitutional practice,102 and has long been under-
stood as an important guarantor of the ability of the legislature to 
serve its constitutional functions.103 
 
100 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
101 See JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW:  LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND 
DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 212-14, 222-34 
(2007) (describing the theory and history of the houses’ power to punish nonmembers 
for contempt); see also MORTON ROSENBERG & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER:  LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PRO-
CEDURE 2-4 (2008) (noting that a congressional contempt power “has been deemed 
implicit in the Constitution’s grant to Congress of all legislative powers” by the Su-
preme Court); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 842, at 305 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) (“[I]t is obvious, that, un-
less such a power [to punish nonmembers for contempt], to some extent, exists by im-
plication, it is utterly impossible for either house to perform its constitutional func-
tions.”); C.S. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (pt. 2), 74 U. PA. L. 
REV. 780, 780 (1926) (“[C]ourts in this country and in England have practically with-
out exception recognized the existence of the right of legislative bodies to protect 
their rightful privileges and to remove obstructions to the proper performance of their 
functions, by use of their contempt powers against offenders . . . . [T]he right has been 
justified by courts on both sides of the Atlantic . . . on the ground of necessity.”). 
102 See CHAFETZ, supra note 101, at 193-206 (tracing this power in English constitu-
tional history). 
103 For Congress to perform any of its functions, it must have access to infor-
mation.  See J.W. Fulbright, Congressional Investigations:  Significance for the Legislative Pro-
cess, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 441 (1951) (“The power to investigate is one of the most 
important attributes of the Congress.  It is perhaps also the most necessary of all the 
powers underlying the legislative function.”); James M. Landis, Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 209 (1926) (“To 
deny Congress power to acquaint itself with facts is equivalent to requiring it to pre-
scribe remedies in darkness.”).  And in order for it to have reliable access to infor-
mation, it must have the contempt power.  See Allen B. Moreland, Congressional Investiga-
tions and Private Persons, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 189, 189 (1967) (“In practical terms, the 
inquisitorial authority of the Congress ends at the point where a witness will be ex-
cused . . . for refusing to obey a congressional summons to appear or to produce papers, 
or for refusing to answer questions posed by a member or committee of Congress.”). 
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Because holding contempt hearings took a great deal of congres-
sional time and energy, Congress in 1857 passed a statute providing 
for criminal prosecution of anyone who refused to obey a congres-
sional subpoena,104 and a slightly modified version of that statutory re-
gime remains in place today.105  However, it is clear that the statutory 
regime cannot have displaced the houses’ inherent contempt power.  
Even assuming, arguendo, that Congress could have surrendered this 
power entirely, there is no evidence that it intended to deliver its abil-
ity to enforce its demands for information wholly into the hands of 
executive prosecutorial discretion.106  Indeed, doing so would have in-
sulated executive branch officers from any consequences for disobey-
ing a congressional subpoena, at least so long as their refusal was pur-
suant to administration policy.107  Given the importance of Congress’s 
role in overseeing the executive branch, it is clear that it must have 
some means of forcing information from that branch.108 
Moreover, each house of Congress has the institutional where-
withal to investigate, adjudicate, and punish contempts against itself.  
The houses’ sergeants-at-arms can arrest and bring before the houses 
any alleged contemnors who refuse to appear109—and, indeed, the 
House has twice used this power against executive branch officers.110  
The same committee structures that allow the houses to conduct inves-
tigations into substantive matters also allow them to conduct investiga-
tions into refusals to cooperate with those substantive investigations.111  
Having conducted those investigations, the houses of Congress can 
use the same decisionmaking procedures by which they settle other 
issues to make final determinations as to whether or not contempt has 
 
104 Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 1, 11 Stat. 155, 155-56.  
105 2 U.S.C. §§ 192–194 (2006).  
106 See ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra note 101, at 21 (“It is clear from the floor 
debates and the subsequent practice of both Houses that the legislation was intended 
as an alternative to the inherent contempt procedure, not as a substitute for it.”).  
107 See Chafetz, supra note 45, at 1131-32. 
108 See id.  
109 See CHAFETZ, supra note 101, at 222-23 (noting that the House sent its sergeant-
at-arms to arrest nonmembers in a contempt proceeding for the first time in the 
Fourth Congress).   
110 See Chafetz, supra note 45, at 1135-39 (discussing the contempt proceedings 
against George Seward, Minister to China, and H. Snowden Marshall, federal District 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York). 
111 See ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra note 101, at 15-20 (describing the proce-
dures the houses have used in exercising their inherent contempt power); see also Mi-
chael A. Zuckerman, The Court of Congressional Contempt, 25 J.L. & POL. 41, 68-80 (2009) 
(recommending certain procedural innovations in how the houses handle contempt 
proceedings). 
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been proven.112  When the contempt is committed by a private indi-
vidual, the punishments available to the houses are limited to repri-
mand and imprisonment.113  Although one could imagine situations in 
which the executive branch might refuse to prosecute a private citizen 
who had been held in contempt by one of the houses, such situations 
would be rare,114 and one can therefore assume that most cases of con-
tempt of Congress by private citizens will be tried and punished by Ar-
ticle III courts under the statutory regime described above.115 
The situation changes, however, when the alleged contemnor is 
not a private citizen but rather a member of the executive branch.  As 
noted above, in such cases, the fact of prosecutorial discretion makes 
the houses’ own inherent contempt power essential;116 equally im-
portantly, when the alleged contemnor is a member of the executive 
branch, the punishment options available to the houses broaden sig-
nificantly.  Of course, the option of arrest still remains potent—
Congress has the capacity to arrest and imprison contemnors without 
the aid of the executive branch.117  And the fact that Congress has 
twice arrested and held on its own authority executive branch offic-
ers118 should put to rest any claim that it is categorically unwilling to or 
 
112 See ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra note 101, at 15-20 (discussing the history of 
contempt adjudications in congressional committees). 
113 The Supreme Court has insisted that the congressional power to punish is lim-
ited to “‘the least possible power adequate to the end proposed;’ which is the power of impris-
onment.”  Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821).  The houses have 
also made use of reprimands.  See, e.g., 2 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1616–1619, at 1083-89 (1907) 
(describing the House’s reprimand of Samuel Houston, then a private citizen, for as-
saulting a member of Congress because of the member’s remarks during a debate). 
114 Indeed, I am not aware of any.  The closest situation of which I am aware is one 
in which the Department of Justice sought a court order enjoining a private party from 
complying with a congressional subpoena.  See United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 
385 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  The Department’s attempt to enjoin compliance with the sub-
poena likely implies that, had the House found the private party in contempt for refus-
ing to comply with the subpoena, the Department would have declined to prosecute.  
Ultimately, however, the matter was settled by negotiation, so the issue of contempt 
never arose.  See Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle 
for Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 745-46 (2002) (describing the ap-
pellate court’s role in fostering a negotiated settlement). 
115 See supra text accompanying notes 104-05. 
116 See supra text accompanying notes 106-08. 
117 See Chafetz, supra note 45, at 1152 (“[E]ach house has a sergeant-at-arms, and 
the Capitol building has its own jail.  The sergeant can be sent to arrest contemnors 
and, if necessary, hold them in his custody until either their contempt is purged or the 
congressional session ends.”).  
118 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.  
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incapable of doing so.  Still, the power of arrest may be somewhat too 
potent—a blunderbuss in a situation in which a rifle may be more apt.  
Here is where it again becomes important to view congressional power 
holistically.  In a dispute over executive branch defiance of a subpoe-
na, the houses of Congress have a number of tools to enforce compli-
ance.  They can turn to the power of the purse, zeroing-out the salary 
of the officer who has defied the subpoena or cutting funds for her 
department.119  The House can open an impeachment inquiry into the 
contemnor’s conduct.  The Senate can refuse to confirm the admin-
istration’s nominees to executive branch offices until the Executive’s 
officer complies with the subpoena.  And either house can simply de-
cide that it will not turn to legislative matters in which the executive is 
invested until its demands are satisfied.  Each of these mechanisms is a 
form of leverage by which a single house of Congress, acting alone, can 
respond to executive branch contempt of Congress.  Of course, they fall 
along a continuum of disruptiveness—the bigger weapons may be more 
effective, but they may also cause more collateral damage that harms 
the house politically.  A wise house would be careful in using any of 
them.  But at the point at which a house has gotten as far as holding a 
member of the executive branch in contempt, some response is surely 
called for, and the menu above provides a wide range of options. 
But recently, Congress has opted for something weaker than any 
of them.  Following what appeared to be the politically motivated dis-
missal of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006,120 the House and Senate Judici-
ary Committees sought testimony from various executive branch offi-
cials, who promptly asserted executive privilege.121  Negotiations broke 
down; the House Judiciary Committee issued subpoenas; and the ex-
ecutive branch defied those subpoenas.122  Eventually, the House 
found White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten and former White 
House Counsel Harriet Miers in contempt.123  When the House in-
 
119 See supra Section I.A.  
120 For just a sampling of the literature on the U.S. Attorney controversy, see OF-
FICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opr/us-att-firings-rpt092308.pdf; John McKay, Train 
Wreck at the Justice Department:  An Eyewitness Account, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265, 267-92 
(2008); Mark J. Rozell & Mitchel A. Sollenberger, Executive Privilege and the U.S. Attorneys 
Firings, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 315, 319-24 (2008); David C. Weiss, Note, Nothing Im-
proper?  Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan Motivation, and Pre-
textual Justification in the U.S. Attorney Removals, 107 MICH. L. REV. 317, 322-32 (2008). 
121 Chafetz, supra note 45, at 1087. 
122 Id. at 1087-88. 
123 Id. at 1088. 
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voked the statutory contempt mechanism, the Attorney General noti-
fied the Speaker that the Department of Justice would not prosecute 
Miers or Bolten.124  Rather than make use of any of the tools discussed 
above, the House filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that Miers and Bolten were in contempt and an injunction 
ordering them to comply with the congressional subpoenas.125 
Miers and Bolten argued that the suit should be dismissed on 
standing and nonjusticiability grounds and because there was no 
proper cause of action; the district court rejected these arguments126 as 
well as their claims of absolute executive privilege.127  It did, however, 
hold that they could return to court with specific privilege claims 
against specific demands by the committee.128  The court of appeals 
granted Miers’s and Bolten’s motion for a stay of the district court 
judgment pending appeal.129  It also noted, in dicta, that the case 
could well become moot upon the expiration of the Congress in 
which the contempt finding was made.130  Finally, in March 2009, a 
compromise was reached in which some of the material subpoenaed 
would be turned over and Miers and Karl Rove would testify under 
oath, but in closed proceedings.131 
By choosing to bring the courts in, the House underplayed its 
constitutional hand and undercut its own aims in a number of ways.  
First, and most immediately, the House allowed its inquiry into the 
Bush Administration to be frustrated and its oversight role to be cor-
respondingly reduced.  Not only did the settlement result in the 
House’s getting less than it had determined that it was due, but the 
timing here was also crucial.  The U.S. Attorney firings occurred in 
late 2006; the congressional subpoenas were issued in mid-2007; the 
House held Miers and Bolten in contempt in early 2008; and yet the 
 
124 See id. at 1086-89 (describing these events in more detail). 
125 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2008).  
126 Id. at 65-99.  
127 Id. at 99-107.  
128 Id. at 106. 
129 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per cu-
riam), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 08-5357, 2009 WL 3568649 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 
14, 2009).  
130 Id.  Judge Tatel rejected this possibility.  See id. at 912 (Tatel, J., concurring). 
131 See Carrie Johnson, Deal Clears Rove, Miers to Discuss Prosecutor Firings, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 5, 2009, at A8 (noting that the interviews would be transcribed and without 
cameras and that certain matters would be off-limits); see also Comm. on the Judiciary 
v. Miers, No. 08-5357, 2009 WL 3568649, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2009) (dismissing the 
case pursuant to the settlement). 
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House did not get any information at all until mid-2009.132  Or, to put 
it differently, the subpoenaed information was not handed over to 
Congress until after the Bush Administration was safely out of office, 
the Congress that had issued the subpoenas had expired, and the U.S. 
Attorney controversy was long out of the news.  Moreover, there can 
be no doubt that the Administration could have dragged the matter 
out significantly longer, had it needed to.  First, it could have waited 
for a final ruling from the court of appeals.  Quite possibly, that ruling 
would have come after the expiration of the Congress that had issued 
the subpoenas, and the court suggested that could well have mooted 
the case.133  If so, then the whole process would have had to start over 
in early 2009.  Even if the court of appeals had affirmed the district 
court’s ruling, the Administration could still have petitioned for re-
hearing en banc134 and then a writ of certiorari.135  Even if these were 
both denied relatively expeditiously, the district court’s ruling made it 
clear that Miers and Bolten could then have argued executive privi-
lege in response to each individual question asked or document re-
quested.136  And then, of course, those specific claims would have had 
to be adjudicated.  In short, once Congress turns to the courts to en-
force its contempt finding, an administration can likely keep the 
House or Senate tied up in litigation until that administration is out of 
office, regardless of how early in the administration’s tenure the issue 
arises.  And if the administration is lucky, intervening congressional 
elections will usher in legislators more inclined simply to let the mat-
ter drop.  To put it succinctly, Congress cannot win in court—even if 
the courts ultimately side with it over the executive branch, the Ad-
ministration can ensure that those final rulings come far too late to 
allow Congress effectively to oversee executive branch operations.137 
But Congress’s self-inflicted wound may well go even deeper.  In 
seeking the aid of the judiciary, the House was announcing to the 
world its belief in its own impotence.  The House had already de-
clared that Miers and Bolten were in contempt; it then asked a district 
court judge to issue a declaratory judgment that Miers and Bolten 
 
132 See Chafetz, supra note 45, at 1086-93 (describing the events in more detail). 
133 See Miers, 542 F.3d at 911. 
134 See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (laying out the procedure for rehearing en banc).  
135 See SUP. CT. R. 10-16 (describing the certiorari process). 
136 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 106 (D.D.C. 2008).  
137 See Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations:  Preserving a 
Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Ex-
ecutive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71, 81, 84 (1986) (noting the effect of delay 
in hindering congressional oversight). 
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were in contempt—in essence, suggesting that, while the executive 
may not listen to a house of Congress, of course it would listen to a fed-
eral district judge.  This point was thoroughly internalized by the dis-
trict court itself, which wrote that 
imprisoning current (and even former) senior presidential advisors and 
prosecuting them before the House would only exacerbate the acrimony 
between the two branches and would present a grave risk of precipitat-
ing a constitutional crisis.  Indeed, one can easily imagine a stand-off be-
tween the Sergeant-at-Arms and executive branch law enforcement offi-
cials concerning taking Mr. Bolten into custody and detaining him.  
Such unseemly, provocative clashes should be avoided, and there is no 
need to run the risk of such mischief when a civil action can resolve the 
same issues in an orderly fashion.
138
 
It seemed literally unimaginable to the court that the executive 
branch might resist a court order as readily as it would resist an order 
from the House.  And the House, in choosing to invoke the court’s 
authority rather than its own, played right into this perception.  It re-
inforced the idea that the judiciary is the domain of reasoned, princi-
pled judgments that must be respected, while congressional action in 
defense of its powers is “unseemly.”139  As David Mayhew has noted, 
congressional action does not simply reflect public opinion; it shapes 
it as well.140  To the extent, then, that even the houses of Congress 
themselves publicly subscribe to the notion that congressional self-
assertion is degraded, debased, or unseemly, how can that not lessen 
their power?  In contrast, in recent years, one would be hard pressed 
to find the executive branch141 or the judiciary142 making such self-
effacing claims. 
 
138 Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 92 (citation omitted).  
139 Id.  
140 See MAYHEW, supra note 34, at 18, 96, 202-03, 239-40.  
141 See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. 377, 387-88 (2011) (book review) (describing the Bush Administra-
tion’s “assertions of [executive] constitutional preeminence” and Bush Administration 
official John Yoo’s attempt to provide scholarly justification for these assertions).  But 
cf. Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive:  Presidential Spinoffs in National Secu-
rity Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 810-28 (2011) (suggesting that, at least 
twice in recent decades, the executive branch has voluntarily and unilaterally limited 
its own discretion). 
142 See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 45, at 1153-54 (discussing the judiciary’s recent 
habit of referring to itself as the “ultimate arbiter” of constitutional issues).  
CHAFETZ REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2012  7:26 PM 
742 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 715 
II.  SOFT POWER 
Contempt of Congress is an apt bridge between congressional 
hard powers and congressional soft powers.  While the authority to 
hold nonmembers in contempt falls within the category of hard pow-
ers, Congress’s reluctance to fully assert itself in this area has the ef-
fect of diminishing its soft power.  Recall that, in separation-of-powers 
conflicts—as in international conflicts—soft powers are those that are 
exercised in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the civilian 
population.143  When the houses of Congress take public stands that 
(explicitly or implicitly) denigrate their own ability to act in princi-
pled, public-interested ways, they diminish their own soft power.  In 
turning to the courts in an attempt to enforce its contempt citation, 
the House of Representatives was inattentive to soft power concerns. 
Indeed, this inattentiveness marks much of Congress’s relation-
ship to its soft power tools generally, as we shall see in this Part. 
A.  The Freedom of Speech or Debate 
The Constitution guarantees that, “for any Speech or Debate in ei-
ther House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in 
any other Place.”144  The legislative privilege of freedom of speech and 
debate is an ancient one; the House of Commons is known to have as-
serted the privilege as early as 1397.145  By the middle of the sixteenth 
century, the Speaker’s petition to the Monarch, delivered at the be-
ginning of every new session of the House of Commons, formally 
claimed it as one of the ancient privileges of Parliament.146  Of course, 
as with so many constitutional principles, the Stuart monarchs hon-
ored it more in the breach than the observance,147 and it was therefore 
formalized as part of the Revolution Settlement in 1689.  Article 9 of 
 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 26-35.  
144 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.  
145 See CHAFETZ, supra note 101, at 69 (discussing the Haxey case); HENRY ELSYNGE, 
THE MANNER OF HOLDING PARLIAMENTS IN ENGLAND 179-81 (London, Richardson & 
Clark 1768) (same); F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 241 
(H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1908) (same); CARL WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMEN-
TARY PRIVILEGE 23-24 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1921) (same). 
146 See, e.g., 1 H.C. JOUR. 37 (1554) (noting that the Speaker petitioned Queen 
Mary for “free Speech in the House” and that the Queen granted the petition).  For 
the history of the Speaker’s petition generally, see J.E. Neale, The Commons’ Privilege of 
Free Speech in Parliament, in 2 HISTORICAL STUDIES OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT 1399-
1603, at 147, 157-59 (E.B. Fryde & Edward Miller eds., 1970). 
147 See CHAFETZ, supra note 101, at 72-74 (chronicling conflicts between the Stuarts 
and Parliament over the speech privilege). 
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the Bill of Rights expressly provides that “the Freedome of Speech and 
Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.”148 
At the time of the American founding, four states explicitly pro-
tected legislative speech and debate in their state constitutions,149 and 
two more had general provisions protecting legislative privilege, which 
seems to have included protecting legislative speech and debate.150  
Indeed, given the extent to which the American colonial and early 
state legislatures looked to Parliament for an understanding of their 
privileges and procedures,151 it would be surprising if the privilege 
were not understood to exist by structural necessity in the other states 
as well.  The Articles of Confederation,152 as well as the Constitution,153 
contained a speech or debate clause. 
Although there are, of course, debates about the outer limits of 
the speech or debate privilege, its core is clear enough:  members of 
Congress cannot be held criminally or civilly liable for speech acts 
(speaking, debating, introducing legislation, voting, etc.) performed 
 
148 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Suc-
cession of the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 9.  On this provision in 
the Bill of Rights, see generally S.A. de Smith, Parliamentary Privilege and the Bill of 
Rights, 21 MOD. L. REV. 465, 468-75 (1958); Geoffrey Lock, The 1689 Bill of Rights, 37 
POL. STUD. 540, 552-54 (1989). 
149 See MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VIII, reprinted in 3 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC 
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1686, 1687 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) 
[hereinafter THORPE]; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XXI, reprinted in 3 THORPE, 
supra, at 1888, 1892; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XXX, reprinted in 4 THORPE, su-
pra, at 2453, 2457; N.C. CONST. of 1776, Form of Government, art. XLV, reprinted in 5 
THORPE, supra, at 2787, 2794. 
150 See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. IX (providing that the state legislature would “en-
joy the same privileges . . . as the assemblies of the colony of New York of right former-
ly did”), reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 149, at 2623, 2631; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. 
XVI (providing that the state legislature “shall enjoy all other privileges which have at 
any time been claimed or exercised by the commons house of assembly”), reprinted in 6 
THORPE, supra note 149, at 3248, 3252; S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VII (same), reprinted in 
6 THORPE, supra note 149, at 3241, 3244.  In South Carolina, at least, those privileges 
clearly included freedom of speech and debate.  See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PAR-
LIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 94 (1943) (noting a claim of the 
speech or debate privilege in the South Carolina colonial legislature as early as 1701). 
151 See JACK P. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES:  ESSAYS IN COLONIAL POLITICAL 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 189-99 (1994) (discussing the extent to which New 
World legislatures borrowed Old World privileges).   
152 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 5.  
153 U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1. 
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in Congress.154  In a political system in which the legislature debates 
and discusses openly and publicly,155 speech acts performed in Con-
gress are directed not only toward other members of Congress, but 
toward the public as well.  The Speech or Debate Clause thus protects 
members’ ability to communicate with their constituents, as well as 
 
154 As the Supreme Court put it in 1880, 
It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it to words 
spoken in debate.  The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to writ-
ten reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, 
which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of vot-
ing, whether it is done vocally or by passing between the tellers. In short, to 
things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in rela-
tion to the business before it. 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880). 
155 The House of Representatives has always met publicly, as a general rule, alt-
hough it can go into secret session under certain specified conditions.  See RULES OF 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES R. XVII, § 9, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-162, at 760-62 
(2009).  The Senate met secretly for its first five years.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 15 ( Jo-
seph Gales ed., 1834) (editor’s note).  This secrecy, however, was criticized on the 
grounds that it was inconsistent with popular sovereignty, and the Senate eventually 
bowed to public pressure and opened its proceedings to the public.  See DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:  THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 10 
(1997).  As with the House, the Senate retains the ability to go into secret session un-
der certain specified conditions.  See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE R. XXI, in COMM. 
ON RULES AND ADMIN., U.S. SENATE, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, 
ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE U.S. SENATE, S. DOC. 
NO. 110-1, at 1, 20 (2008).  It should be noted that the ability to meet in secret is very sel-
dom used.  See Eric Lane et al., Too Big a Canon in the President’s Arsenal:  Another Look at 
United States v. Nixon, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 737, 758 (2010) (noting that the House 
met secretly only six times between 1825 and 2008 and that the Senate met secretly on-
ly fifty-four times between 1925 and 2010). 
 Moreover, the Constitution itself, through the Journals Clause, requires a certain 
level of openness.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of 
its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same . . . .”).  As David Currie has 
noted, “[N]either chamber interpreted the journal provision to require a verbatim 
transcript of its proceedings.”  CURRIE, supra, at 10.  However, newspapers carried ex-
tensive coverage of debates in the House from the beginning, and they covered Senate 
debates with the same level of detail once the Senate opened its galleries.  Indeed, The 
Annals of Congress, published by Gales and Seaton between 1834 and 1836, is simply a 
compilation of such newspaper accounts for the Congresses meeting between 1789 
and 1824.  See Seth Barrett Tillman, The Annals of Congress, the Original Public Mean-
ing of the Succession Clause, and the Problem of Constitutional Memory 8-10 ( June 
30, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1524008 
(describing the Annals).  It is thus clear that American political and constitutional 
norms have long required that legislative proceedings be open, except in sharply lim-
ited circumstances.  This norm has, of course, only strengthened with the advent of 
televised congressional proceedings. 
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with one another.156  In doing so, it gives them a potent weapon in  
interbranch struggles. 
Consider the Pentagon Papers case.  No, the other Pentagon Papers 
case.  For most of us, the name conjures New York Times v. United 
States,157 in which the heroic Court stood up for freedom of the press 
against a secrecy-obsessed executive branch.158  And it is certainly not 
my intention here to denigrate New York Times v. United States, which I 
agree is an important defense of a free press.  But what often gets lost 
in the discussion is that, before the Supreme Court ruled, far more of 
the Pentagon Papers159 than the newspapers would ever publish160 had 
already irretrievably entered the public record. 
 
156 This, indeed, was the theme of a petition that Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Vir-
ginia House of Delegates in 1797 on the subject of the speech or debate privilege.  See 
Thomas Jefferson, Petition to Virginia House of Delegates (asserting that the privilege 
exists to ensure that representatives “in the discharge of their functions, should be free 
from the cognizance or coercion of the coordinate branches, Judiciary and Executive; 
and that their communications with their constituents should of right, as of duty also, be 
free, full, and unawed by any”), in 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON IN TWELVE VOL-
UMES 322, 322 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).  See generally CHAFETZ, supra note 101, at 
88-89 (discussing Jefferson’s comments); id. at 90-93 (discussing the importance of con-
stituent communication in understanding the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause). 
157 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971) 
(per curiam).  
158 Lionization of New York Times v. United States is widespread.  See, e.g., CHRISTO-
PHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 73 (2001) (listing it as one of 
the Court’s four “greatest moments” in the second half of the twentieth century); Wil-
liam R. Glendon, The Pentagon Papers—Victory for a Free Press, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 
1306 (1998) (arguing that the importance of the case “cannot be overstated”); Gordon 
Silverstein & John Hanley, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion in Times of War and Crisis, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1453, 1479 (2010) (“Most casual readers think of the Pentagon Papers 
case as a great victory for the freedom of the press.  And it was.  But it was at least equally 
significant as a statement on the separation of powers and executive power in wartime.” 
(footnotes omitted)); see also J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of 
Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 974 n.43 (1998) (listing New York Times v. Unit-
ed States as one of only eighteen “truly canonical” American constitutional law cases (cit-
ing Jerry Goldman, Is There a Canon of Constitutional Law?, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N NEWSL. 
(Law and Courts Section of the Am. Political Sci. Ass’n), Spring 1993, at 2-4)). 
159 The Pentagon Papers is the popular name for the top secret Pentagon study pre-
pared between 1967 and 1969 and officially titled “History of U.S. Decision Making Pro-
cess on Vietnam Policy.”  The complete study was over seven thousand pages long and 
was bound in forty-seven volumes.  Only parts of it were leaked.  See DAVID RUDENSTINE, 
THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED:  A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 2, 27 (1996). 
160 Three editions of the Pentagon Papers were eventually published in book form.  
The first, published by Bantam, consisted of the New York Times’s edition of the Papers, 
as well as various supplementary material by the Times.  NEIL SHEEHAN ET AL., THE 
PENTAGON PAPERS AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES (1971).  It is the shortest of 
the three.  The other two—the Gravel edition, THE PENTAGON PAPERS:  THE SENATOR 
GRAVEL EDITION (1972) (in five volumes) [hereinafter GRAVEL EDITION], and the gov-
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The New York Times published its first three articles on the Penta-
gon Papers on June 13, 14, and 15, 1971.161  On June 15, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a 
temporary restraining order barring further publication while the 
court adjudicated the government’s motion for an injunction.162  On 
June 18, the Washington Post ran its first story on the Papers,163 and on 
June 19, a district court issued a temporary restraining order against 
the Post.164  The same day, the Southern District of New York ruled for 
the Times, denying the government’s motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion;165 the Second Circuit immediately stayed the decision, thus keep-
ing the temporary restraining order in effect, and on June 23, it re-
manded for further proceedings in the district court with the 
temporary restraining order still in place.166  Also on June 23, the D.C. 
Circuit denied the government’s motion for an injunction, but stayed 
its order until June 25.167  On June 25, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in both cases, consolidated them, and set oral arguments for 
the next day;168 on June 30, the Court handed down its celebrated de-
cision.169  Only then did the Times and Post resume publication.170 
 
ernment’s own edition, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS, 
1945–1967 (1971) (in twelve volumes)—are both significantly longer.  Each of these 
contains material that the others lack, but even combined they do not comprise the 
entirety of the Pentagon Papers.  In 2011, the government finally released the entirety 
of the Papers.  See Michael Cooper & Sam Roberts, After 40 Years, the Complete Pentagon 
Papers, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2011, at A12. 
161 Neil Sheehan, Vietnam Archive:  Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. 
Involvement, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1971, at A1; Neil Sheehan, Vietnam Archive:  A Consen-
sus to Bomb Developed Before ‘64 Election, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1971, at A1; Neil 
Sheehan, Vietnam Archive:  Study Tells How Johnson Secretly Opened Way to Ground Combat, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1971, at A1.  
162 United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).  
163 See Chalmers M. Roberts, Documents Reveal U.S. Effort in ‘54 to Delay Viet Election, 
WASH. POST, June 18, 1971, at A1. 
164 See United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per 
curiam).  
165 N.Y. Times, 328 F. Supp. at 331. 
166 United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 444 F.2d 544, 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) 
(per curiam).  
167 United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc) 
(per curiam). 
168 United States v. Wash. Post Co., 403 U.S. 943 (1971); N.Y. Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 942 (1971).  
169 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per 
curiam).  
170 See Sanford J. Ungar & George Lardner, Jr., War File Articles Resumed, WASH. 
POST, July 1, 1971, at A1 (“Newspapers throughout the nation, expressing satisfaction 
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The night before, however, Mike Gravel, a first-term senator from 
Alaska, had placed 4100 pages of the Pentagon Papers into the public 
record.  Daniel Ellsberg, the same RAND Corporation analyst who 
had leaked the Papers to the press, had given them to Gravel as well.171  
After an attempt to read them on the floor of the Senate failed due to 
lack of a quorum,172 Gravel convened a 9:45 p.m. meeting of the Build-
ings and Grounds Subcommittee of the Senate’s Environment and 
Public Works Committee.173  Gravel, the subcommittee chair, was the 
only Senator in attendance; an anti-war House member was rounded 
up to serve as the “witness” whose “testimony” would provide the im-
petus for Gravel’s reading the Papers into the record.174  Gravel read 
aloud from the Papers until approximately 1:00 a.m. the next morn-
ing, at which point he broke down in tears.175  He then entered the 
remaining pages into the subcommittee record.176  By the time he re-
turned to his office, his staff was already photocopying the “subcom-
mittee record” and handing it out to reporters.177  By the time the 
Court ruled, roughly twelve hours later,178 the Papers could not have 
been removed from the public sphere. 
Even after the Court’s ruling, Gravel came to the conclusion that 
some combination of the threat of criminal prosecution179 and news-
 
over the Supreme Court decision, rushed into print last night with articles based on 
the once-secret Pentagon papers on Vietnam.”).  
171 Daniel Ellsberg, Foreword to MIKE GRAVEL & JOE LAURIA, A POLITICAL ODYSSEY:  
THE RISE OF AMERICAN MILITARISM AND ONE MAN’S FIGHT TO STOP IT 9, 9-10 (2008).  
172 GRAVEL & LAURIA, supra note 171, at 27-29.  
173 Id. at 30.  
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 35-36.  
176 Id. at 38.  
177 Id.  
178 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per 
curiam); see also RUDENSTINE, supra note 159, at 302 (noting that the Court announced 
its judgment at 2:30 PM on June 30).  
179 The Supreme Court majority held simply that the government’s requested in-
junction would constitute an impermissible prior restraint.  403 U.S. at 714.  But three 
Justices dissented, id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 752 (Harlan, J., joined by 
Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting), and two Justices in the majority explicitly 
held open the possibility of post-publication criminal sanction, id. at 730 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); id. at 733, 740 (White, J., concurring).  It was thus perfectly plausible 
that the newspapers, their reporters, and their editors might still be criminally pros-
ecuted for publishing the Papers, and, indeed, the Justice Department briefly pur-
sued such prosecutions before ultimately abandoning them.  See RUDENSTINE, supra 
note 159, at 339-43 (describing the unsuccessful prosecutions of Daniel Ellsburg and 
Anthony Russo and considering why no further criminal charges were brought in 
connection with the Papers). 
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room cowardice led the newspapers to publish too little of the Pa-
pers.180  He accordingly arranged to have the entire “4,100-page sub-
committee record” published by Beacon Press.181  Subsequently, in the 
course of the grand jury investigation into the leaking of the Papers, 
Gravel’s aide, Leonard Rodberg, was subpoenaed, as was the director 
of the MIT Press, where Gravel had tried to publish his edition of the 
Papers.182  Gravel intervened with a motion to quash the subpoenas on 
Speech or Debate Clause grounds.183  The case eventually reached the 
Supreme Court, which found it “incontrovertible” that Gravel himself 
would be privileged against “questioning elsewhere than in the Sen-
ate, with respect to the events occurring at the subcommittee hearing 
at which the Pentagon Papers were introduced into the public rec-
ord.”184  And given that Gravel was privileged, Rodberg must have 
been, too, because 
it is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legisla-
tive process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of leg-
islative concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to per-
form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; . . . the 
day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the Members’ performance 
that they must be treated as the latter’s alter egos; and . . . if they are not so 
recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate Clause—to prevent 
intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a 
possibly hostile judiciary—will inevitably be diminished and frustrated.
185
 
The Court went on to hold, however, that Gravel’s agreement to pub-
lish the Papers was not privileged, on the grounds that “private publica-
tion by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon Press was in 
no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate; nor does question-
ing as to private publication threaten the integrity or independence of 
the Senate by impermissibly exposing its deliberations to executive in-
fluence.”186  Gravel ’ s  second holding seems difficult to defend:  not only 
does it suggest that communication with constituents—with “We the 
People”—is not an essential part of legislative activity, but it also draws 
an arbitrary line between placing something in the public record and 
 
180 See GRAVEL & LAURIA, supra note 171, at 49-50 (suggesting that the newspapers 
stopped publishing portions of the Papers in response to legal pressure).  
181 Id. at 50-51; see also 5 GRAVEL EDITION, supra note 160, at 314-15 (describing 
the text of the Gravel edition).  
182 RUDENSTINE, supra note 159, at 340-41. 
183 See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1972).  
184 Id. at 615.  
185 Id. at 616-17 (citation omitted).  
186 Id. at 625.  
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arranging for easier public access to it through private publication.187  
The arbitrariness of the Court’s line also points to its unworkability.  
So long as putting matters into the public sphere in the context of 
floor debates or committee hearings is protected—and the Court 
properly ruled that it is—then that material can be picked up, report-
ed upon, and read by the public. 
And it’s a good thing, too.  Today, we rightly consider the release 
of the Pentagon Papers to be an important milestone in the checking 
of an imperial presidency at war.188  While some amount of secret 
keeping is undoubtedly necessary for effective governmental opera-
tions, it is well understood that the executive branch has a tendency to 
keep too many secrets and to withhold information that merely em-
barrasses it or undermines its public standing.189  Moreover, to the ex-
tent that the executive branch prefers secrecy to disclosure, it has a 
special incentive to maintain “deep secrets”—that is, secrets whose ex-
istence, and not just content, is unknown to outsiders.190  After all, no 
one can make pesky demands to know the contents of a secret if the 
 
187 For criticism of Gravel’s second holding, see CHAFETZ, supra note 101, at 99-
100; Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Gravel and Brewster Cases:  An Assault on Congressional Inde-
pendence, 59 VA. L. REV. 175, 184-88 (1973). 
188 See INSIDE THE PENTAGON PAPERS 183 ( John Prados & Margaret Pratt Porter 
eds., 2004) (“[T]he Pentagon Papers revelation ‘lent credibility to and finally crystal-
ized the growing consensus that the Vietnam War was wrong and legitimized the radi-
cal critique of the war.’  The leak also began a period of militancy on the part of the 
press.”); Heidi Kitrosser, What If Daniel Ellsberg Hadn’t Bothered?, 45 IND. L. REV. 89, 93 
(2011) (“[T]he leak . . . is invoked in judicial opinions and in public debates alike for 
the proposition that it is dangerous to defer heavily to executive branch judgments, 
including executive claims that certain information is too dangerous to release.  It is 
highly plausible that this social learning effect imposes practical constraints on the ex-
ecutive’s ability to take legal action against classified information leaks and publica-
tions.”); id. at 100 (“The Papers thus helped to disrupt the momentum of the national 
security state and the imperial presidency.  It forced a crisis in the culture of deference 
and trust on which those phenomena relied.”). 
189 See, e.g., ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (not-
ing the “unfortunate tendency of government officials to over-classify information”); 
Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy:  Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 399, 401-07 (2009) (summarizing the literature on overclassification); Harold Ed-
gar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 
73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 1085 (1973) (noting that “substantial overclassification is inevi-
table given the variety of inducements to official secrecy”). 
190 See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 260 (2010) (explaining 
that secrets are deep when “we do not know [that] we do not know” some relevant 
fact); see also id. at 274 (offering a more formal definition of a “deep” secret as one 
where “a small group of similarly situated officials conceals its existence from the pub-
lic and from other officials, such that the outsiders’ ignorance precludes them from 
learning about, checking, or influencing the keepers’ use of the information”). 
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very existence of the secret is unknown.  And yet, as David Pozen has 
convincingly demonstrated, the deeper a secret is, the more troubling 
it is on utilitarian, democratic, and constitutional grounds.191 
Members of Congress, using their Speech or Debate Clause im-
munity, can go a long way toward mitigating the most damaging types 
of executive branch secrecy.  To the extent that deep secrecy is unjus-
tified (for example, the existence of a program of warrantless wire-
tapping192), members of Congress can reveal the existence of the se-
crets.  To the extent that shallow secrecy is justified (for example, the 
names of covert operatives), members of Congress can act as demo-
cratically accountable checks on the executive, reassuring the public 
that the executive’s assertion of the need for secrecy really is valid.193  
But this is only the case if members of Congress are willing, as Senator 
Gravel was, to make their own judgments about the need for secrecy, 
giving a respectful hearing but not absolute deference to the execu-
tive branch. 
Consider another, more recent, example:  the 2011 reauthoriza-
tion of portions of the PATRIOT Act.194  During floor debate, Senators 
Ron Wyden and Mark Udall argued that the Obama Administration 
had adopted an implausible and disturbing secret legal interpretation 
of portions of the PATRIOT Act.195  Senator Wyden insisted that 
“[w]hen the American people find out how their government has se-
cretly interpreted the PATRIOT Act, they are going to be stunned and 
they are going to be angry.”196  In making these claims, the Senators 
took what had been a deep secret and made it shallow:  the public is 
now aware of the existence, but not the content, of this secret legal in-
 
191 See id. at 275-323.  
192 See Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone:  Wiretapping and Article 
II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1406-07 (2010) (describing the Terrorist Surveil-
lance Program, whose existence was kept secret from 2001 to 2005).  
193 See Pozen, supra note 190, at 330 (arguing that “[m]embers of Congress . . . are 
ideally positioned to serve as the people’s proxy in vetting and checking otherwise 
deep presidential secrets”).  
194 Patriot Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (to be 
codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805, 1861, 1862).  
195 See Charlie Savage, Senators Say Patriot Act Is Being Misinterpreted, N.Y. TIMES, May 
27, 2011, at A17 (“During the debate, Senator Ron Wyden . . . said that the executive 
branch had come up with a secret legal theory about what it could collect under a pro-
vision of the Patriot Act that did not seem to dovetail with a plain reading of the 
text. . . . Senator Mark Udall, Democrat of Colorado, backed Mr. Wyden’s account.”).  
196 157 CONG. REC. S3386 (daily ed. May 26, 2011) (statement of Sen. Ron Wy-
den); see also id. at S3389 (statement of Sen. Mark Udall) (“Americans would be 
alarmed if they knew how this law is being carried out.”). 
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terpretation.  Perhaps the Senators did not go far enough—we should 
be deeply skeptical of secret laws, as opposed to secret facts.197  Per-
haps they should have disclosed the content of the interpretation.  But 
at least now the public is able to debate whether the interpretation 
should be released—and it is able to do so because these Senators 
made use of their privilege of free congressional speech. 
Of course, Speech or Debate Clause immunity can be abused.  
Members of Congress can release information that truly ought to be 
kept secret.  And the executive, fearing release by Congress, may 
choose to withhold such sensitive information from Congress.  But 
these concerns are frequently overblown.  First, although one often 
hears “the standard executive claim that Congress leaks like a sieve,”198 
one seldom sees any evidence for that claim.199  The executive branch, 
of course, has a strong incentive to make that claim, as it would prefer 
to withhold as much information from Congress as possible.  We 
should be wary, then, of taking such executive branch claims at face 
value.  Indeed, consider again the Pentagon Papers, which the gov-
ernment claimed were so damaging that it sought a court order en-
joining their publication.  Recall that Senator Gravel did not release 
the Papers in their entirety—rather, he released approximately 4100 
out of a total of 7800 pages.200  Moreover, before he released those 
pages into the public record, he excised those names that he judged 
should continue to receive shallow secrecy.201  And despite the Nixon 
Administration’s hyperventilation over the Papers’ release, their re-
lease did not harm American national interests (as distinct from the 
interests of the Nixon Administration).  Indeed, Erwin Griswold, Nix-
on’s Solicitor General who argued the Pentagon Papers case for the 
 
197 See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1688, 1724-30 (2011) (reviewing ACKERMAN, supra note 2) (arguing that the work of 
the Office of Legal Counsel should be disclosed); Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws:  
How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 579, 601-29 (2009) (same). 
198 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
865, 885 (2007).  
199 See Pozen, supra note 190, at 331 (“[T]o my knowledge no one inside or outside 
the [second Bush] administration ever marshaled any evidence, even anecdotal evi-
dence, to justify” the claim that Congress is especially leak prone); see also Kathleen 
Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 915, 936-51 
(describing the institutional features that allow Congress to keep secrets). 
200 5 GRAVEL EDITION, supra note 160, at 314. 
201 See GRAVEL & LAURIA, supra note 171, at 34-35 (recounting how Senator Gravel 
and his staff spent five nearly sleepless days making context-based decisions about 
which names to remove).  
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government, repeatedly said as much,202 and the preeminent historian 
of the Papers concurs.203  There is simply no reason to think that Con-
gress cannot be every bit as careful with information as the executive 
branch. 
Indeed, Congress’s record might well be better than that of the 
executive branch.  Consider that the 2010–2011 disclosures to  
WikiLeaks—which have been called “the most radical form of unau-
thorized disclosure since the leak of the Pentagon Papers”204—seem to 
have come from executive branch sources.205  And for sheer spiteful-
ness, it is hard to imagine a congressional leak as bad as the outing of 
Valerie Plame as a covert CIA agent by Vice President Cheney’s Chief 
of Staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby.206  From the point of view of the pub-
lic, there simply does not seem to be a lot of evidence that the Speech 
or Debate Clause privilege results in a large number of harmful dis-
closures.  Congress can be trusted—at least as much as the executive 
branch can—to keep those secrets that need to be kept.  And, as the 
Pentagon Papers show, Congress can also be trusted, at least some-
times, to bring to light secrets that the executive would rather keep, 
but that the nation would rather know. 
But what about from the point of view of the executive branch?  
After all, what will Congress have to release if the executive branch re-
fuses to give it any information?  Again, concerns about access to in-
 
202 See ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, OULD FIELDS, NEW CORNE:  THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS 
OF A TWENTIETH CENTURY LAWYER 310 (1992) (“As far as I know, . . . none of the ma-
terial which was ‘objectionable’ from my point of view was ever published by anyone, 
including the newspapers, until several years later.”); Erwin N. Griswold, ‘No Harm Was 
Done,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, at E15 (“In hindsight, it is clear to me that no harm 
was done by publication of the Pentagon Papers.”); Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth 
Keeping, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25 (“I have never seen any trace of a threat to 
the national security from the publication.  Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested 
that there was such an actual threat.”). 
203 See RUDENSTINE, supra note 159, at 327-28 (noting that neither Nixon nor Kis-
singer claimed any damages from the Papers’ publication in their memoirs and con-
cluding that “[t]here is no evidence” that the release of the Papers “harmed the U.S. 
military, defense, intelligence, or international affairs interests”). 
204 Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects:  WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4-5) (italics omitted), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1797945. 
205 For a discussion of WikiLeaks and its disclosures, see generally Yochai 
Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press:  WikiLeaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked 
Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 315-51 (2011); Fenster, supra note 204 
(manuscript at 4-16).  
206 For the details of the Plame affair, see generally Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role 
of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists’ Confidentiality, 1795–2005, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 425, 464-65 (2006).  
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formation drying up, while important, tend to be overblown.  First, 
the executive, like Congress, is a “they,” not an “it.”207  There may fre-
quently be those in the executive branch with access to secret infor-
mation who want that information brought to light—much like Daniel 
Ellsberg did with the Pentagon Papers and Bradley Manning did with 
some of the documents posted on WikiLeaks.  Indeed, to the extent 
that members of Congress are perceived as democratically legitimate 
and responsible in a way that news outlets or website operators are 
not, executive branch employees may feel more comfortable leaking 
material to them.  To encourage such disclosure, Congress may want 
to consider providing enhanced whistleblower protection to executive 
branch employees who leak to Congress instead of to the press.208 
Equally important, Congress need not rely on the executive 
branch’s good will to extract information from it.  Here, again, it is 
important to think of congressional powers as a mutually reinforcing 
set.  As we have seen, a house of Congress can subpoena information 
that the executive branch does not wish to surrender, and it can begin 
contempt proceedings if the executive defies the subpoena.209  It can 
also use its power of the purse, refusing to fund programs about which 
it is given inadequate information.  None of these mechanisms, of 
course, will get Congress everything it might want, but they are all 
tools that it can use against a hostile executive branch. 
And they are very much tools that are meant to be used in the 
public sphere.  When Congress responsibly releases to the public in-
formation that the public wants, it enhances its own prestige and, 
hence, its power.  It simultaneously knocks the President down a peg 
by showing the American people what he sought to withhold from 
them.  The power to reveal information is, ultimately, a soft power.  As 
such, its potency depends entirely on how well the member of Con-
gress using it gauges public sentiment.  A member releasing, say, the 
names of covert operatives would likely find his public standing dimin-
ished, not bolstered.  But, as the aftermath of the release of the Pen-
tagon Papers shows, a member who uses the power properly can en-
hance his own, and his branch’s, stature, especially in relation to an 
executive branch that appears to be fighting to keep its own failures 
and misdeeds out of the public eye. 
 
207 Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”:  Legislative Intent as Ox-
ymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992) (“[T]here is not a single legislative 
intent, but rather many legislators’ intents.  Congress is a ‘they’, not an ‘it.’”).  
208 See Pozen, supra note 190, at 332 n.287 (raising this possibility).  
209 See supra Section I.B.  
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B.  Internal Discipline 
With power, of course, comes the imperative to exercise it respon-
sibly.210  Hence, the Speech or Debate Clause’s prohibition on punish-
ing members “in any other Place” for their congressional speech 
acts211 must be read in pari materia with the provision that “[e]ach 
House may . . . punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with 
the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”212  Congress has the 
primary responsibility for policing itself, and a member who irrespon-
sibly releases information that should have remained secret can ex-
pect to face discipline from her own house.  But the responsible exer-
cise of power can itself be a source of power.  After all, most people 
are more trusting of an institution that has proven itself a good stew-
ard of the powers that it already has than they are of one that has not.  
As Philip Pettit has argued, 
 Not only can the mechanisms of loyalty, virtue, and prudence make it 
sensible for me to believe in the motivating efficacy of manifesting reli-
ance, and make it sensible for me to trust the person in question in a 
relevant domain.  The mechanisms can also explain why trust builds on 
trust:  why trust tends to grow with use, not diminish.  For it should be 
clear that as I test and prove someone suitably loyal, suitably virtuous, or 
suitably prudent, I have reason to be reinforced in my disposition to put 
those mechanisms to the test in future acts of trust.
213
 
In other words—and intuitively—evidence of an actor’s trustworthi-
ness makes it more likely that further trust will be placed in that actor.  
Survey evidence indicates both that this conception of trust extends to 
public institutions and that perceptions of ethics are directly tied to 
trust in public institutions.214  And finally, the power of institutions is 
directly tied to the public’s trust in them:  trusted institutions have 
“more leeway to govern effectively and . . . a larger store of support.”215  
In short, a Congress that proves itself trustworthy is, in the long run, a 
more powerful Congress.  And a principal element of trustworthiness 
 
210 Or, as Spider-Man more pithily put it, “[W]ith great power there must also 
come—great responsibility!”  STAN LEE, STEVE DITKO & ART SIMEK, AMAZING FANTASY 
NO. 15, at 11 (1962), reprinted in 1 THE ESSENTIAL SPIDER-MAN (2004). 
211 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.  
212 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  
213 Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 202, 209-10 (1995).  
214 See Eran Vigoda-Gadot, Citizens’ Perceptions of Politics and Ethics in Public Administra-
tion:  A Five-Year National Study of Their Relationship to Satisfaction with Services, Trust in Gov-
ernance, and Voice Orientations, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 285, 288-91, 301 (2007). 
215 Marc J. Hetherington, The Political Relevance of Political Trust, 92 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 791, 803 (1998). 
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is ethical behavior.  In this regard, then, congressional ethics en-
forcement can be a significant source of soft power. 
The power of legislative houses to discipline their members has a 
long history, and, like the power to punish nonmembers,216 arises out 
of the need to “protect the integrity and dignity of the legislative insti-
tution and its proceedings.”217  By the sixteenth century, the House of 
Commons had asserted the right to punish its members (often by im-
prisoning them in the Tower of London) for breaches of parliamen-
tary privilege and contempts against the House.218  And by the late-
seventeenth century, one can find examples of expulsion for what we 
would today call violations of parliamentary ethics—for example, John 
Ashburnham was expelled from the House in 1667 for receiving mon-
ey from “the French Merchants.”219  Similarly, in 1695, Henry Guy was 
sent to the Tower of London “for taking a Bribe of Two hundred 
Guineas.”220  Indeed, the British Parliament took its commitment to 
internal discipline so seriously for so long that it was not until 2010 
that members of Parliament could be prosecuted in the courts for ac-
cepting bribes.221  Prior to that point, only parliamentary discipline was 
available.222  New World colonial assemblies, too, exercised disciplinary 
power over their members.223  Indeed, the foremost historian of par-
liamentary procedure in the American colonies has written that, 
“when one sees [one of these assemblies] imposing almost precisely 
 
216 See supra Section I.B.  
217 JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31382, EXPULSION, CENSURE, REPRI-
MAND, AND FINE:  LEGISLATIVE DISCIPLINE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1 (2005).  
218 See CHAFETZ, supra note 101, at 194-95 (recounting the sixteenth-century 
precedents). 
219 9 H.C. JOUR. 24 (1667). 
220 11 H.C. JOUR. 236 (1695).  
221 See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 12(8).  Roughly simultaneously, the United King-
dom Supreme Court ruled that parliamentary privilege did not protect members 
charged with submitting false claims for expense reimbursement.  R v. Chaytor, [2010] 
UKSC 52 [89]-[93] (appeal taken from Eng.); see also Yvonne Tew, Case Note, No Long-
er a Privileged Few:  Expense Claims, Prosecution, and Parliamentary Privilege, 70 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 282, 282-83 (2011) (discussing Chaytor and the narrow construction of the scope of 
parliamentary privilege that it adopted). 
222 See ERSKINE MAY’S TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE 
OF PARLIAMENT 134-35 (Sir William McKay et al. eds., 23d ed. 2004) (noting that, at 
the time of its publication, no member of Parliament had ever been convicted of brib-
ery in a court of law); see also Dawn Oliver, The Committee on Standards in Public Life:  
Regulating the Conduct of Members of Parliament, 48 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 590, 595-96 
(1995) (noting the long history and theory behind exclusive parliamentary jurisdiction 
over matters of parliamentary ethics).  
223 See CLARKE, supra note 150, at 173-204. 
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the same punishments upon its own members [as it did upon outsid-
ers], one naturally concludes that here was a body that took parlia-
mentary government very seriously indeed.”224  Even from the vantage 
point of the historian, then, a commitment to legislative self-discipline 
redounded to the houses’ credit. 
The American states continued this tradition:  three wrote an ex-
pulsion power into their post-Revolutionary constitutions,225 and other 
states may have seen it as unnecessary given the short terms for which 
legislators were elected226—the voters could be responsible for any 
needed “expulsions.”  A number of the other state constitutions had 
general provisions protecting legislative privilege227 or allowing the legis-
lative houses to determine their own rules of proceedings,228 which 
would have sufficed to justify disciplinary measures short of (and per-
haps including) expulsion.  And, as already noted, both a general disci-
plinary power (“Each House may . . . punish its Members for disorderly 
Behavior.”229) and a supermajoritarian230 expulsion power (“Each House 
 
224 Id. at 185.  
225 See DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 5, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 149, at 562, 
563; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. X, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 149, at 1686, 1687; 
PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 9, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 149, at 3081, 3085.  
226 See AMAR, supra note 10, at 75 (noting that, under their Revolutionary constitu-
tions, “[t]wo states held elections for the lower house twice a year, ten others ran an-
nual elections, and only one—South Carolina—gave lower-house members two-year 
terms.  Although several state upper houses featured multiyear terms, none exceeded 
five years.”); see also WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS:  REPUB-
LICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTION-
ARY ERA 241-43 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, ex-
panded ed. 2001) (1973) (describing the brief legislative terms in the Revolutionary 
state constitutions). 
227 See MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 1, § 3, art. XI, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 149, 
at 1888, 1898; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. IX, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 149, at 3248, 
3252; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XVI, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 149, at 3248, 3252; 
S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VII, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 149, at 3241, 3244. 
228 See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VII, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 149, at 777, 
779; MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 1, § 2, art. VII, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 149, at 
1888, 1897; id. § 3, art. X, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 149, at 1897; N.H. CONST. 
of 1784, pt. 2, Senate, para. 12, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 149, at 2453, 2460-61; 
id. House of Representatives, para. 12, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 149, at 2462; 
VA. CONST. of 1776, Form of Government, para. 27, reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra note 
149, at 3812, 3816. 
229 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  
230 The supermajority requirement was added at the urging of James Madison, 
who “observed that the right of expulsion . . . was too important to be exercised by a 
bare majority of a quorum:  and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously 
abused.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966).  
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may . . . with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”231) were 
explicitly written into the new national Constitution. 
Beginning early in their histories, the congressional houses made 
significant use of their disciplinary powers.  In July 1797, President 
Adams presented both houses of Congress with documentary evidence 
that Senator William Blount of Tennessee had proposed to work with 
the British and Indian tribes to seize Spanish Florida and Louisiana.232  
The Senate impaneled a select committee to investigate, and, upon its 
recommendation, Blount was expelled by a vote of twenty-five to 
one.233  In other early incidents, the houses used their disciplinary 
powers over members in cases including assaulting a fellow member, 
insulting the dignity of the house, and fighting for the Confederacy.234  
Disciplinary proceedings were also frequently instituted against mem-
bers accused of corruption or abuse of power.235  The most frequent 
punishment has been censure or reprimand, although both expulsion 
and (increasingly in recent years) fines have been used as well.236  And, 
of course, plenty of members have chosen to resign their seats rather 
than face discipline from their houses.237 
Indeed, judicial involvement in congressional ethics came late—
albeit not quite as late as judicial involvement in British parliamentary 
ethics.238  As recently as 1966, the courts were deeply reluctant to 
probe into congressional ethics.  Thomas Johnson, a former con-
gressman from Maryland, was convicted of seven counts of violating 
the federal conflict-of-interest statute and one count of conspiring to 
defraud the United States.239  Johnson had allegedly taken money 
 
231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
232 RICHARD D. HUPMAN, SENATE LIBRARY, SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION AND 
CENSURE CASES FROM 1793 TO 1972, S. DOC. NO. 92-7, at 3 (1972). 
233 Id.; see also CURRIE, supra note 155, at 275-76 (describing the Blount expulsion). 
234 See CHAFETZ, supra note 101, at 214-20 (describing cases falling within each of 
these categories).  
235 See id. at 220-22 (providing examples). 
236 See id.; see also MASKELL, supra note 217, at 13-14 (describing the use of fines 
and monetary assessments in the House of Representatives). 
237 But cf. Josh Chafetz, Leaving the House:  The Constitutional Status of Resignation 
from the House of Representatives, 58 DUKE L.J. 177, 227-30 (2008) (arguing that the 
House of Representatives can and should refuse to allow resignations precisely in or-
der to punish malfeasors); Eric Lipton & Eric Lichtblau, Report Urges U.S. to Consider 
Charging Ensign, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A13 (“The Senate Ethics Committee took 
the unusual step of releasing the results of its investigation into [former Senator John] 
Ensign, even though it no longer has the power to punish him.”). 
238 See supra text accompanying notes 221-22.   
239 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 170-71 (1966).  
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from a savings-and-loan company in exchange for delivering a favora-
ble speech on the floor of the House, copies of which the company 
then distributed to potential depositors.240  When the case reached the 
Supreme Court, it held that the Speech or Debate Clause barred the 
use of evidence as to “questions of who first decided that a speech was 
desirable, who prepared it, and what Johnson’s motives were for mak-
ing it.”241  The Court, moreover, noted the centrality of this evidence 
to the government’s case: 
The conspiracy theory depended upon a showing that the speech was 
made solely or primarily to serve private interests, and that Johnson in 
making it was not acting in good faith, that is, that he did not prepare or 
deliver the speech in the way an ordinary Congressman prepares or de-
livers an ordinary speech.  Johnson’s defense quite naturally was that his 
remarks were no different from the usual congressional speech, and to 
rebut the prosecution’s case he introduced speeches of several other 
Congressmen speaking to the same general subject, argued that his talk 
was occasioned by an unfair attack upon savings and loan associations in 
a Washington, D.C., newspaper, and asserted that the subject matter of 
the speech dealt with a topic of concern to his State and to his constitu-
ents.  We see no escape from the conclusion that such an intensive judi-
cial inquiry, made in the course of a prosecution by the Executive 
Branch under a general conspiracy statute, violates the express language 
of the Constitution and the policies which underlie it.
242
 
Note the breadth of this rationale:  any evidence going to a member’s 
motives for undertaking a legislative act is off-limits.  But many serious 
issues of congressional ethics are entirely about motive—after all, 
members are allowed to accept campaign contributions, and they are 
allowed to vote however they wish and make whatever floor speeches 
they wish.  It is only bribery when they vote or speak because of the con-
tribution.  Johnson held that it is precisely evidence that goes to this 
causal linkage that is inadmissible.  Thus, as late as 1966, it was clear 
that primary responsibility for enforcing serious ethical rules would 
have to lie with the houses themselves. 
But a mere six years later, the Court took a very different tack in 
reviewing the bribery prosecution of Senator Daniel Brewster of Mary-
land.243  In holding that the Speech or Debate Clause posed no bar to 
this prosecution, the Court asserted that “[t]aking a bribe is, obvious-
ly, no part of the legislative process or function; it is not a legislative 
 
240 Id. at 171-72.  
241 Id. at 184.  
242 Id. at 177.  
243 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).  
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act.  It is not, by any conceivable interpretation, an act performed as a 
part of or even incidental to the role of a legislator.”244  Accordingly, 
evidence of bribe-taking was not evidence of the sort prohibited by the 
Speech or Debate Clause.245  In dissent, Justice White asserted that this 
case was not distinguishable from Johnson.246  More importantly for our 
purposes here, he resisted the Court’s claim that this was a job for the 
judiciary:  “The Speech or Debate Clause does not immunize corrupt 
Congressmen.  It reserves the power to discipline in the Houses of 
Congress.  I would insist that those Houses develop their own institu-
tions and procedures for dealing with those in their midst who would 
prostitute the legislative process.”247 
Brewster has been subject to significant criticism,248 and it is not my 
purpose to repeat that criticism here.  But the fact that it was not until 
the 1970s that the judiciary took primary responsibility for enforcing 
congressional ethics—and thus that the executive took primary re-
sponsibility for investigating and prosecuting members for ethical vio-
lations—should suggest that it is neither an inevitable nor a necessary 
feature of our constitutional landscape.  Moreover, the perfectly pre-
dictable result of Brewster has been to lessen any desire in the houses 
of Congress to investigate and punish ethical breaches themselves.  Af-
ter all, if the executive and judiciary will do it for them—and members 
can generally be expected to resign in shame when facing prosecu-
tion—then why should the houses engage in the distasteful task of pun-
ishing their colleagues themselves?249  Thus, in 2002, the House of Rep-
resentatives expelled James Traficant of Ohio only after he had been 
convicted on ten counts of bribery, racketeering, and corruption.250 
 
244 Id. at 526.  
245 Id. at 528-29.  
246 Id. at 553-55 (White, J., dissenting). 
247 Id. at 563.  
248 See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note 101, at 106-07 (arguing that meeting with constit-
uents is an essential part of a legislator’s duties and therefore that what transpires in 
such meetings is protected by the speech or debate privilege); Ervin, supra note 187, at 
186-91 (characterizing the majority decision as betraying a “shocking lack of under-
standing of the essential elements of the legislative process and the representative role 
of the legislative branch”). 
249 As Mike Dorf has noted, judicial enforcement of norms can “crowd out” en-
forcement of those same norms by other institutional actors.  Michael C. Dorf, How the 
Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF 
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 77 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar 
Himma eds., 2009). 
250 Alison Mitchell, House Votes, with Lone Dissent from Condit, to Expel Traficant from 
Ranks, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at A13.  For an entertaining account of Traficant’s life 
and crimes, see David Grann, Crimetown USA, NEW REPUBLIC, July 10 & 17, 2000, at 23. 
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Now consider the soft power implications of this shift.  When con-
gressional ethics violations are ceded to the normal criminal process, 
the executive branch and the courts get to play the heroes as they fer-
ret out corruption by powerful actors in the name of the public inter-
est.  Meanwhile, when Congress punishes at all, it does so only for mi-
nor infractions that do not warrant criminal prosecution, or it does so 
long after the other branches have already acted.  What is the public 
message?  It is that Congress protects its own and hands out slaps on 
the wrist and that only the executive and the courts can be trusted to 
keep politics clean.  And to the extent that this lesson is internalized 
by the public, it fosters a narrative that Congress is institutionally cor-
rupt.251  Some level of corruption is probably inevitable in political in-
stitutions, whether they are legislative, executive, or judicial.252  But to 
the extent that only the executive and the judiciary act to root out 
corruption, the public will come to see them as trustworthy and Con-
gress as untrustworthy.  In refusing to clean up its own messes, then,  
Congress is sacrificing its soft power. 
Were the houses of Congress inclined to reassume this power, 
they might well give some thought to Justice White’s insistence that 
they “develop their own institutions and procedures for dealing with 
those in their midst who would prostitute the legislative process.”253  In 
2008, the House of Representatives created the Office of Congres-
sional Ethics, an internal entity charged with reviewing allegations of 
misconduct and recommending action to the House Ethics Commit-
tee.254  There is some evidence that the Office has led the House to 
take a more active role in investigating ethical lapses.255  Still, the Sen-
ate contains no comparable entity, and even the House Office is not 
 
251 See Shaun Bowler & Jeffrey A. Karp, Politicians, Scandals, and Trust in Govern-
ment, 26 POL. BEHAV. 271 (2004) (arguing that scandals by individual members of 
Congress cause a decline in the public perception of Congress as an institution). 
252 Cf. Letter from John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton to Mandell Creighton 
(Apr. 5, 1887) (“Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”), in 
JOHN EMERICH EDWARD DALBERG-ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 358, 364 
(Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1948). 
253 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S 501, 563 (1972) (White, J., dissenting); see 
also supra text accompanying note 247.  
254 See H.R. Res. 895, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007) (establishing the Office of Congres-
sional Ethics).  
255 See, e.g., Eric Lipton, House Ethics Office Gains, Dismissals Aside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
23, 2010, at A18 (“Wielding the sheer power of political shame . . . , the Office of Con-
gressional Ethics ha[s] helped spur worried party leaders to rein in abuses and make 
errant lawmakers pay a price.”).  
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as vigorous as it could be.256  To the extent that the houses wish to en-
hance their soft power vis-à-vis the other branches, demonstrating that 
they have the collective judgment and maturity to clean up their own 
messes is surely a step in the right direction. 
C.  Cameral Rules 
The House was able to create the Office of Congressional Ethics 
because of its constitutional power to “determine the Rules of its Pro-
ceedings.”257  Each house has substantial authority to shape its internal 
procedural rules.  But internal organization can have significant ex-
ternal consequences.  Cameral rules can be used to reassure the pub-
lic that the house is worthy of its trust—the creation of the Office is a 
step in this direction.  But they can also be used in ways that harm the 
houses, giving the other branches a strong justification for poaching 
congressional power. 
As an example of the latter, consider the filibuster.  Although the 
filibuster’s origins lie in the Senate’s tradition of unlimited debate,258 
it no longer has much of anything to do with debate.  Instead, the fili-
buster now operates as a standing supermajority requirement in the 
Senate for nearly all measures.259  Recent years have seen significant 
debate over the constitutionality of the filibuster,260 and it is not my 
 
256 See Josh Chafetz, Comment, Cleaning House:  Congressional Commissioners for 
Standards, 117 YALE L.J. 165, 169-72 (2007) (suggesting what a model of a truly vigor-
ous cameral ethics body, modeled on the British Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Standards, would look like). 
257 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  
258 See FLOYD M. RIDDICK, SENATE PROCEDURE:  PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. 
NO. 97-3, at 568 (1981) (noting that “[t]he Senate operates under the practice of un-
limited debate”); Richard R. Beeman, Unlimited Debate in the Senate:  The First Phase, 83 
POL. SCI. Q. 419 (1968) (discussing the history of “unlimited debate” in the Senate). 
259 For a description of the modern filibuster, see Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitution-
ality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1006-11 (2011).  See also Aaron-Andrew P. 
Bruhl, The Senate:  Out of Order?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1043-46 (2011) (discussing the 
effect of the supermajority requirement in the 111th Congress); David R. Mayhew, Su-
permajority Rule in the U.S. Senate, 36 PS:  POL. SCI. & POL. 31, 31 (2003) (“Automatic 
failure for bills not reaching the 60 mark.  That is the current Senate practice . . . .”). 
260 See, e.g., GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING:  A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUC-
TION IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 39-42 (2010) (suggesting that the Constitution antici-
pates some measure of obstruction in Congress); GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICK-
LER, FILIBUSTER:  OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE 280-81 (2006) 
(arguing that the filibuster is constitutional but that a simple majority can change the 
Senate rules at any time); Chafetz, supra note 259, at 1011-16 (arguing that the con-
temporary filibuster is unconstitutional); Josh Chafetz & Michael J. Gerhardt, Debate, 
Is the Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 245 (2010), http:// 
www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Filibuster.pdf (debating the constitutionality of 
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purpose here to rehash those debates.  Nor do I want to focus on 
whether there are good policy justifications for supermajority rules as 
an internal deliberative device.  Rather, my focus here is on the effect 
of the filibuster on the separation of powers. 
Put simply, the filibuster results in the transfer of power from 
Congress to the other branches, and especially to the executive.  Be-
cause the filibuster now operates as an absolute bar to the passage of 
measures that command the support of fewer than sixty Senators, 
many measures with broad and deep support will nonetheless fail to 
pass.  This gives the President a strong rhetorical ploy:  a matter of 
such importance, he can argue, deserves at the very least an up-or-
down vote.  Yet congressional “dysfunction” and “stalemate” have 
made this impossible.  Strong executive action is therefore needed, he 
will argue. 
This argument is not merely hypothetical.  Consider the fate of 
recent legislative attempts to combat global warming.  In 2009, after 
significant arm-twisting by Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the House of Repre-
sentatives passed a bill by a vote of 219 to 212 that would have created 
a “cap-and-trade” system for greenhouse gases.261  It never received a 
vote in the Senate.  When Senator Rockefeller was asked about the 
Senate version of the bill (which was sponsored by Senators Kerry and 
Lieberman), he responded: 
I think there is a dominant concern [which is] “What’s the point of do-
ing anything without 60 votes?” . . . And I think that there’s some feeling 
that you don’t spend time on the floor trying to figure out if you have 
got 60 votes.  You have to understand before you go to the floor that you 
have got 60 votes.
262
 
 
the filibuster); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
181, 224-52 (1997) (concluding that the filibuster is unconstitutional insofar as it en-
trenches itself but that an unentrenched filibuster would be constitutional); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445, 450-70 (2004) 
(arguing that the filibuster is constitutional); Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The 
Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and Procedures:  A Majoritarian Means to Over 
Come the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205 (2004) (arguing that the filibuster is 
unconstitutional and discussing possible Senate maneuvering for eliminating it); John 
C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress:  Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the Senate 
Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505 (2004) (arguing that an entrenched filibuster is uncon-
stitutional and therefore that the filibuster can be eliminated by majority vote); Virginia 
A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A Constitutional Defense of “Entrenched” Senate Rules Governing 
Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1 (2004) (defending the constitutionality of the filibuster). 
261 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
§§ 721–728 (2009).  
262 Ben Geman, Senate Turns Down Resolution to Block EPA Gas Regulations, THE 
HILL, June 11, 2010, at 3 (first alteration in original). 
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When asked whether he thought Kerry’s bill could get sixty votes, 
Rockefeller replied:  “I don’t think so. But I think John [Kerry] 
does.”263  Rockefeller was right and Kerry was wrong—the sixty votes 
never materialized, and the bill was never brought to the Senate floor. 
But this did not spell the end of the government’s attempt to 
combat global warming.  The Supreme Court had ruled in 2007 that 
the Clean Air Act required the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to consider whether greenhouse gases constituted an air pollu-
tant that endangered public health or welfare.264  In the waning years 
of the Bush Administration, the EPA was in no hurry to complete this 
review,265 but the Obama Administration issued an endangerment 
finding in late 2009.266  The threat of EPA regulation was enough to 
convince some House members to vote for the cap-and-trade bill, in 
order to ensure that they had a say in environmental policy.267  Some 
observers expected a similar dynamic to play out in the Senate.268  But 
while that motivation was strong enough to secure a House majority, it 
was not strong enough to secure a Senate supermajority—that is, it 
was not strong enough to overcome the filibuster. 
In May 2010, the EPA issued its first regulation pursuant to the 
endangerment finding, raising vehicle fuel economy standards.269  The 
next month, the filibuster again protected executive power when fifty-
three Senators supported a measure to strip the EPA’s authority to 
 
263 Id. (alteration in original). 
264 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-35 (2007). 
265 See Juliet Eilperin, White House Tried to Silence EPA Proposal on Car Emissions, 
WASH. POST, June 26, 2008, at A2 (describing the Bush Administration’s stifling of 
greenhouse gas regulation in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA).  
266 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (Endan-
germent Finding). 
267 See Louis Peck, A Veteran of the Climate Wars Reflects on U.S. Failure to Act, YALE 
ENV’T 360 (Jan. 4, 2011), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/a_veteran_of_the_climate 
_wars_reflects_on_us_failure_to_act/2356 (interview with former Representative Rick 
Boucher) (explaining that he supported the bill because “if Congress did not act, EPA 
would regulate”).   
268 See, e.g., Bradford Plumer, Does Obama Need Congress to Act on Climate Change?, 
NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Dec. 4, 2008, 3:40 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-
vine/does-obama-need-congress-act-climate-change (“Republicans may not be able to 
stymie carbon regulations for long, since the choice isn’t between something or noth-
ing; it’s between Congress capping emissions or Obama doing it for them.  As the say-
ing goes, better to sit at the table than find yourself on the menu.”). 
269 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Aver-
age Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 85, 86, 600 (2011)). 
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regulate greenhouse gases.270  Because this fell short of the sixty votes 
needed to end a filibuster, the measure failed,271 and the EPA contin-
ues to set government policy on greenhouse gases.272  And polls have 
consistently shown high levels of public support for greenhouse gas 
regulation by the EPA, even in the aftermath of a serious recession.273 
Notice the effect of the filibuster here.  By making it significantly 
more difficult to pass legislation, the filibuster simply shifted the locus 
of policymaking to the executive branch.  Rather than have environ-
mental policy made through the process of intra- and intercameral 
negotiation and deliberation, the policy is now made in its entirety by 
the EPA.  Of course, the EPA has less leeway in regulating than Con-
gress does in legislating, but so long as the EPA’s regulations are rea-
sonable interpretations of the governing statutory schemes, they will 
not be disturbed.274 
Nor is this policy shift limited to legislation.  In April 2010, Presi-
dent Obama nominated Donald Berwick as Administrator of the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services, a job with significant respon-
sibilities for implementing substantial portions of the health care 
reform legislation passed in 2010.275  When it became apparent that 
 
270 See Geman, supra note 262, at 3.  Of course, even had the bill passed the Senate 
and the House, it would almost certainly have prompted a presidential veto. 
271 Id.  
272 See, e.g., Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for 
Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011) 
(to be codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).  For a discussion of some regulations 
that are currently in the works pursuant to the endangerment finding, as well as 
greenhouse gas regulations passed pursuant to other statutory sources of authority, see 
Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things:  The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation 
Under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 428-44 (2011).  For a 
brief statement of the EPA Administrator’s planned timeline for greenhouse gas regu-
lations, see Letter from Lisa Jackson, EPA Adm’r, to Senator Jay D. Rockefeller IV 
(Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://epa.gov/oar/pdfs/LPJ_letter.pdf. 
273 See CNN & OPINION RESEARCH CORP., CNN OPINION RESEARCH POLL, APR. 9–
10, 2011, at 6 (2011), available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2011/images/04/ 
11/rel6a.pdf (finding that, in April 2011, seventy-one percent of respondents opposed 
stripping the EPA of the authority to regulate greenhouse gases); Washington Post-ABC 
News Poll, WASH. POST (June 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_060810.html (finding between sixty-five and seventy-five 
percent support for federal government regulation of greenhouse gases in four polls 
conducted between April 2009 and June 2010). 
274 See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-
66 (1984) (holding that the courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutory language).  
275 See Robert Pear, President Nominates Professor to Health Job, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 
2010, at A13. 
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Berwick’s nomination would be successfully filibustered, the President 
instead used a recess appointment to install him in the post.276  Simi-
larly, having determined that a nomination of Elizabeth Warren to 
head the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau would 
“linger without Senate action for months,”277 President Obama instead 
appointed her a Special Assistant to the President and Special Adviser 
to the Secretary of the Treasury.278  In this capacity, she was in charge 
of setting up the new agency, but she did not have to face a Senate 
confirmation battle.279  A number of Warren’s supporters subsequently 
urged the President to use a recess appointment to put Warren into 
the directorship,280 although he ultimately opted to nominate Richard 
Cordray.281  He, too, was filibustered, and the Senate conducted pro 
forma sessions in December 2011 and January 2012 in an attempt to 
prevent a recess appointment.282  President Obama, relying on an 
opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel,283 then took the unprece-
dented step of declaring that a Senate recess existed, the pro forma 
sessions notwithstanding, and he installed Cordray in the director-
ship.284  Again, note the dynamic here:  because the filibuster makes it 
so much harder to get anything through the Senate, decisions shift to 
unilateral executive action.  And the President’s public case for uni-
 
276 See Robert Pear, Obama to Bypass Senate to Name Health Official, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 
2010, at A11. 
277 Jim Kuhnhenn, Obama Picks Consumer Advocate Warren, Opposed by Big Bankers, 
Will Build Financial Watchdog Agency, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 18, 2010, at A3. 
278 Paul Wiseman, Warren Gets a Lead Role in Consumer Protection:  Harvard Professor to 
Help Set Up Watchdog Agency, USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 2010, at 1B. 
279 Id.  
280 See Joseph Williams, Liberals Push Elizabeth Warren Nomination, POLITICO (May 
28, 2011, 7:15 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55864.html (“Liber-
al boosters for consumer advocate Elizabeth Warren are redoubling their pressure on 
President Barack Obama to pick her to lead a new financial watchdog agency—despite 
Republicans’ all-out attempts to . . . block Obama from giving her the job over the 
Memorial Day recess.”). 
281 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Former Ohio Attorney General to Head New Consumer 
Agency, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, at B1 (noting the nomination of Richard Cordray).  It 
is worth noting that President Obama’s decision not to recess appoint Warren seems to 
have had significantly more to do with the fact that “she never won the full support of 
the president or his senior advisors” than it did with any concern about the recess ap-
pointment mechanism.  Id. 
282 Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Con-
sumer Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1. 
283 See Memorandum from Virginia A. Seitz, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Kathryn Ruemmler, Counsel to the President ( Jan. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf. 
284 Cooper & Steinhauer, supra note 282. 
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lateral action can be built on the claim that his nominee would have 
enough support in the Senate, but for the countermajoritarian, ob-
structionist use of the filibuster.  Thus, in urging the President to use 
a recess appointment for Warren, political commentator Katrina 
vanden Heuvel noted the threat of a filibuster and wrote that 
“[p]urblind Republican obstruction liberates the president to do the 
right thing.”285  And defending Cordray’s recess appointment, Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe referred to the “transparent and intolerable bur-
dens on [presidential] authority” created by the filibuster of nomi-
nees.286  It would be politically very difficult for the President to recess 
appoint a nominee who had previously been defeated in the Senate.287  
But a filibustered nominee presents a different case—there, indeed, 
the President is “liberated” to act unilaterally. 
In short, by structuring its internal rules the way that it has, the 
Senate has cost itself power vis-à-vis the executive.288  But members of 
the Senate seem to have learned precisely the wrong lesson from this 
state of affairs.  Rather than pursuing rules reform to curb or elimi-
 
285 Katrina vanden Heuvel, Why Obama Should Appoint Elizabeth Warren, WASH. POST 
(May 24, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-obama-should-
appoint-elizabeth-warren/2011/05/23/AFastWAH_story.html; see also Editorial, Nearly 
a Year After Dodd-Frank:  President Obama Must Nominate—And Fight For—Top-Notch Finan-
cial Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at A24 (“Why go with a compromise candi-
date when Republicans have vowed to block any nominee?  Mr. Obama and Senate 
Democrats should back Ms. Warren and expose to American voters just exactly whose 
interests the Republicans put first.”). 
286 Laurence H. Tribe, Games and Gimmicks in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, 
at A25. 
287 Moreover, Congress has used its power of the purse to ensure that such a nomi-
nee would have to serve without pay.  See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-161, Div. D, Title VII, § 709, 121 Stat. 1844, 2021 (2007) (codified at note pre-
ceding 5 U.S.C. § 5501) (“Hereafter, no part of any appropriation contained in this or 
any other Act shall be paid to any person for the filling of any position for which he or 
she has been nominated after the Senate has voted not to approve the nomination of 
said person.”); see also HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21308, RECESS AP-
POINTMENTS:  FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2010) (noting this provision, but also 
noting that, because of the filibuster, “[a]s a practical matter, nominations are rarely 
rejected by a vote of the full Senate”). 
288 This dynamic is hardly new—indeed, an early-twentieth-century observer of late-
nineteenth-century British parliamentary obstructionism noted the same phenomenon: 
A[n] . . . effect of obstructive tactics is that the business of making the laws of a 
nation tends to be centred in a small group of men.  The English Cabinet is a 
case in point.  This situation is a logical result of the diminution of the powers 
of the legislature.  Misuse of functions by a large body inevitably transfers 
those functions to a smaller unit. 
Geddes W. Rutherford, Some Aspects of Parliamentary Obstruction, 22 SEWANEE REV. 166, 
177 (1914).  
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nate the filibuster, they have sought legislation to decrease the num-
ber of posts requiring Senate confirmation.289  In other words, instead 
of altering cameral rules so as to reinforce their chamber’s constitu-
tional role as advisor and consenter to executive branch appoint-
ments,290 these Senators wish to surrender still more of that role.  A far 
better solution was recently suggested by Bruce Ackerman:  the Senate 
should agree to a relatively expeditious up-or-down vote on all execu-
tive branch appointments in return for the White House agreeing to 
subject all leading staffers to Senate confirmation.291  Even if the White 
House rejected this deal, the Senate could still stem the tide of recess 
appointments by unilaterally ceasing to filibuster nominees.  And, of 
course, it could use its power of the purse to prevent the payment of 
salaries to top White House staffers who have not faced Senate con-
firmation,292 thus pressuring the White House to accept Ackerman’s 
grand bargain. 
Although the executive branch is the most obvious beneficiary of 
the filibuster, the judiciary may stand to benefit as well.  One of the 
standard defenses of “dynamic” or “updating” theories of judicial stat-
utory interpretation is that legislative inertia prevents Congress from 
updating statutes itself.293  Of course, some amount of legislative iner-
tia is inevitable in any system, and a great deal more is hardwired into 
our constitutional structure through the mechanisms of bicameralism 
and presentment.  But the filibuster adds yet another inertial obstacle 
to the mix—the status quo is insulated against change unless a pro-
 
289 See Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, S. 679, 
112th Cong. (as passed by Senate, June 29, 2011); see also Carl Hulse, Lawmakers Seek to 
Speed System of Confirmation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at A1 (noting that a proposal to 
“end Senate review of about 200 executive branch positions” has the support of both 
parties’ leadership in the Senate). 
290 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
291 See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 152-55.  
292 See supra Section I.A (discussing Congress’s power of the purse); see also supra 
note 95 and accompanying text (noting that the House of Representatives recently 
successfully negotiated for a rider in a budget bill preventing the President from using 
any funds to pay certain White House “czars”); supra note 287 (noting that Congress 
has used its power of the purse to prevent the disbursement of pay to any recess nomi-
nee who has previously been rejected on the Senate floor).  We thus see once again 
the way that the various congressional hard and soft powers can work in concert to 
cement Congress’s constitutional role.  
293 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 120-21 
(1982) (“[T]he courts in exercising the power to induce the updating of statutes 
should only deal in areas of legislative inertia.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 156-61 (1994) (arguing that dynamic statutory interpre-
tation can help counteract political dysfunction). 
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posal to alter it can garner the support of a supermajority of the Sen-
ate in addition to that of a majority of the House plus the President.  
To the extent that inertia justifies judicial updating, then more inertia 
will mean more updating, and Congress will have still less say in the 
operation of the law. 
We can thus see how each house’s authority over its own internal 
rules can either enhance or diminish its power vis-à-vis the other 
branches.  When that authority is used to create or further a narrative 
of responsibility and trustworthiness—as the House did in creating the 
Office of Congressional Ethics—then it enhances the power of the 
branch.  But when a house uses its power in a way that leads to a nar-
rative of irresponsibility, gridlock, or dysfunction, then it provides a 
justification for the other branches to step in and poach congressional 
power.  As we have seen, the other branches have been all too happy 
to do so. 
III.  THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CONGRESS’S PROPER PLACE 
The previous two Parts have discussed a number of powers that 
individual houses and members of Congress can wield.  In isolation, 
many of them may appear to be inconsequential housekeeping provi-
sions (e.g., each house’s power over the rules of its own proceedings) 
or idiosyncratic, minor, and perhaps even archaic protections (e.g., 
the speech or debate privilege).  But the aim of those Parts has been 
to demonstrate that, viewed as an interlocking whole, these powers are 
potent, indeed, allowing Congress to vigorously assert itself against the 
other two branches.  In this Part, I would like briefly to consider the 
questions of why and how Congress should avail itself of these tools. 
A.  The Desirability of Congressional Self-Assertion 
It will not have escaped notice that some of the powers discussed 
above can appear unseemly at best.  This Article has discussed gov-
ernment shutdowns,294 the use of congressional sergeants-at-arms to 
arrest members of the executive branch,295 and the disclosure of classi-
fied information,296 among other things.  How can these add up to an 
argument in favor of congressional self-assertion? 
 
294 See supra Section I.A.  
295 See supra Section I.B.  
296 See supra Section II.A.  
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The answer to that question consists of two broad parts.  First, 
although attention naturally focuses on the most extreme uses of the-
se congressional powers, it is worth reiterating that many of them can 
be calibrated.  After all, the houses of Congress have a number of 
budgetary tools well short of shutting down the government,297 and 
these will almost always be the tools of first resort in interbranch con-
flicts.  Indeed, the strongest version of a power is often useful primari-
ly as an inducement to other actors to give in on some smaller point—
or, to put it differently, the aim of possessing an especially potent 
weapon is often to avoid having to use it.298  Instead, institutional set-
tlements are negotiated in the shadow of each actor’s powers,299 or, 
more precisely, in the shadow of each actor’s perceptions of both its 
own powers and those of the other actors.  But a public acknowl-
edgement that one will never use a certain power is the functional 
equivalent of not having that power in the first place.  Deals will only 
be negotiated in the shadow of, say, a threat to shut down the gov-
ernment if it is actually credible that a house of Congress will follow 
through on that threat.300 
Second, the fact that the Constitution allocates these powers to 
Congress highlights a too-seldom-appreciated feature of our separa-
tion of powers:  American constitutional design intentionally fosters 
the conditions of interbranch tension and conflict as a means toward 
good governance.  In many situations, the Constitution does not dic-
tate a stable allocation of decisionmaking authority; rather, it fosters 
the ability of the branches to engage in continual contestation for that 
authority.  Put differently, the conflicts that at first strike us as un-
seemly turn out to be, upon further reflection, constitutional features 
rather than bugs. 
Yet much of contemporary constitutional theory is overly enam-
ored of tidy institutional settlement301 and overly timid of ongoing in-
 
297 See supra Section I.A.  
298 This principle, of course, formed the basis of much of Cold War military doc-
trine.  See Matthew Lund, Comment, The Eighty Percent and Twenty Percent Solutions to 
Nuclear Proliferation, 2009 BYU L. REV. 741, 743 (“During the Cold War, political efforts 
and the threat of mutually assured destruction prevented the use of nuclear weapons.”).  
299 Cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 98, at 968-69. 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 85-95 (discussing the last-minute settlement 
averting a government shutdown in April 2011).  
301 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371-81 (1997) (defending judicial supremacy in 
constitutional interpretation entirely on the grounds of the importance of law’s set-
tlement function). 
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stitutional tension and conflict.302  This is nothing new—Machiavelli 
devoted a section of his Discourses to refuting “those who allege that 
the republic of Rome was so tumultuous and so full of confusion that, 
had not good fortune and military virtue counterbalanced these de-
fects, its condition would have been worse than that of any other re-
public.”303  Machiavelli, to the contrary, insisted that 
those who condemn the quarrels between the nobles and the plebs, 
seem to be cavilling at the very things that were the primary cause of 
Rome’s retaining her freedom, and . . . they pay more attention to the 
noise and clamour resulting from such commotions than to what result-
ed from them, i.e. to the good effects which they produced.
304
 
Indeed, it was precisely the “clash” between the interests of the two 
classes that was responsible for “all legislation favourable to liberty.”305  
Or, in Jeremy Waldron’s perceptive summary, we should not be “fooled 
into thinking that calmness and solemnity are the mark of a good poli-
ty, and noise and conflict a symptom of political pathology.”306  Conflict, 
tension, and tumult may be precisely what produces good govern-
ment; easy, authoritative resolution may be the mark of dysfunction. 
Why might this be?  Machiavelli’s view was that the public good lay 
somewhere between the permanent interests of the nobles and those 
of the plebs; any answer arrived at without substantial “noise and 
clamour” suggested that one group was likely dominating the other 
and moving policy too far in its own favor.  Likewise, in the modern 
context, we may well see virtue in the tumultuous clash between gov-
ernment officials, each seeking to convince the public, or some seg-
ment thereof, that she effectively represents its best interests.  Or, to 
put it differently, insofar as the Constitution “proliferat[es] the modes 
of representation governing normal politics”307 because of its judgment 
that “no legal form can transubstantiate any political institution of nor-
 
302 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 691, 716 (2004) (book review) (“Does not our Constitution deliberately 
prefer division, tension, uncertainty, and dynamic equilibrium over ‘authoritative’ res-
olution?”); see also Chafetz, supra note 31, at 1128 (noting that “concern for stability, 
predictability, and notice are at their weakest in the separation-of-powers context”). 
303 NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES, bk. 1, ch. 4, at 113 (Bernard Crick 
ed., Leslie J. Walker trans., Penguin Books 1998) (1531).  
304 Id.  
305 Id.  
306 JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 34 (1999).  
307 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:  Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 
1013, 1028 (1984).  
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mal politics into We the People of the United States,”308 it also deliber-
ately proliferates the points of tension and conflict, noise and clamor. 
Different bodies, with different (but cross-cutting) constituencies, 
different terms of office, and different institutional structures and 
competencies are each given the capacity to fight with one another for 
the affections of the public.  This conflict-enabling view of the separa-
tion of powers has several important benefits.  First, it serves a tyranny-
prevention function.  If one branch seeks to exercise tyrannical pow-
er, the other two branches will have both the incentive, rooted in their 
desire to win over the people’s affections, and the tools, such as those 
congressional powers described throughout this Article, to resist.309  
Second, it serves a representation-enhancing function.  Precisely be-
cause the American governmental scheme recognizes that no public 
servant can ever perfectly represent “We the People” in all of our 
complexity, it multiplies the modes of representation.310  Our short-
term and local selves find representation in the House, while our 
long-term and more general selves are represented in the Senate.  
Our nationally-oriented selves find representation in the singular per-
son of the President, while that part of ourselves that we have given 
over to law rather than politics finds its champion in the judiciary.  
Each of these is a part of our “true” collective self; it is therefore 
through deliberation and productive tension among them that our 
representation is representation at its truest.  Once again, this re-
quires that each of these institutional actors have the capacity and will-
ingness to assert itself vigorously in the public sphere against the oth-
ers.  Third, just as adversarial proceedings in court are understood to 
be truth-promoting, so too vigorous interbranch contestation in the 
public sphere can help to “reveal the truth about the common 
 
308 Id. at 1026.  
309 An apt analogy here is to Hamilton’s classic description of the tyranny-
preventing function of federalism:  “Power being almost always the rival of power, 
the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the 
state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general gov-
ernment.  The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make 
it preponderate.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 9, at 181 (Alexander Hamil-
ton); see also Chafetz, supra note 31, at 1121-22, 1125-26 (drawing the connection be-
tween Hamilton’s discussion of federalism and a multiplicity-based theory of the 
separation of powers). 
310 See Ackerman, supra note 307, at 1027-31 (“Rather than allowing the House or 
Senate or the Presidency to beguile us with the claim that it, and it alone, speaks in the 
name of the People themselves, the constitutional separation of powers deconstructs 
all such naive synechdoches.”).  
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good.”311  Or, to put it differently, interbranch conflict can enhance 
democratic deliberation.  What is more, it can help to reveal the ex-
tent to which messy public contestation produces good government,312 
thus creating a self-reinforcing virtuous cycle of republicanism. 
This “multiplicity-based” view of the separation of powers313 re-
quires that the branches maintain the institutional capacity to assert 
themselves against one another.  It does not require that they always 
assert themselves maximally; rather, it encourages them to assert 
themselves judiciously.  Judiciousness, of course, is in the eye of the 
beholder, and here the relevant beholder is the public.  A judicious 
use of power is one that inspires public trust and confidence in the in-
stitution wielding it.  A multiplicity-based view of the separation of 
powers is thus fundamentally dynamic and discursive.  The separation 
of powers creates the conditions for political contestation, and that 
contestation is carried out with an eye toward winning over the public.  
In recent work, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have perceptively 
argued that “politics and public opinion” are central to the allocation 
of governmental authority.314  But they err when they contrast politics 
and public opinion to “the separation-of-powers framework”315 and to 
“Madisonian deliberation.”316  Rather, the Madisonian framework—
the very framework that gave us the congressional powers discussed in 
this Article—provides the field upon which public opinion battles are 
fought.  Posner and Vermeule come close to recognizing this when 
they write that “oversight—by legislators, judges, or other actors—can 
affect public opinion, which can in turn constrain the president.  
Congress and other institutions are participants in the game of public 
opinion . . . .”317  But Congress is not simply a participant like any oth-
er; it is a participant constituted and structured by the Constitution 
with certain powers that enable it to make an especially strong case for 
public trust.  It can bring executive misconduct to light by releasing 
 
311 Mariah Zeisberg, Constitutional Fidelity and Interbranch Conflict, 13 GOOD SOC’Y, 
no. 3, 2004, at 24, 28.  
312 See supra text accompanying notes 303-06.  
313 So called because it focuses on multiple, overlapping claims of authority by dif-
ferent institutions.  See Chafetz, supra note 31, at 1112-28.  
314 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:   AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4 (2010); see also id. at 113 (emphasizing the role played by “the 
system of elections, the party system, and American political culture” in the distribu-
tion of governmental authority). 
315 Id. at 4.  
316 Id. at 14.  
317 Id. at 25.  
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classified information, secure behind its speech or debate privilege.318  
It can compel the executive to produce information, using its con-
tempt power if need be.319  It can refuse to fund parts (or all) of the 
government, throwing policy disagreements into especially sharp re-
lief for the public.320  And it can burnish its own image by behaving in 
constitutionally responsible ways, including keeping its own houses 
clean321 and adopting sensible internal rules.322 
These are the Madisonian means by which the houses of Congress 
compete in the game of public opinion.  And to compete successfully, 
they must use these means well.  Releasing the Pentagon Papers en-
hanced congressional power vis-à-vis the executive;323 outing secret 
agents likely would not.  Budgetary brinksmanship can work when a 
house of Congress does not overplay its hand;324 when that house 
overreaches, however, it loses authority.325  And this is not simply a 
matter of accurately gauging public opinion—Congress is an active 
shaper of public opinion.326  The content of the Pentagon Papers 
changed the terms of the debate over Vietnam in a way that favored 
Congress over the executive.327  A decision by a house of Congress to 
be more vigorous in enforcing its ethics rules can lead to more public 
trust in the future.328  And a decision by the Senate to eliminate the fil-
ibuster would also eliminate the President’s rationale for doing so 
much via regulation, recess appointments, and White House czars.329  
Politics does not happen in a Habermasian ideal speech situation;330 
active participation in political discourse requires political power.  
And the Constitution creates and structures that power for Congress.  
A Congress that uses those powers vigorously but judiciously serves the 
public good by reducing the risk of tyranny by any one branch, en-
 
318 See supra Section II.A.  
319 See supra Section I.B.  
320 See supra Section I.A.  
321 See supra Section II.B.  
322 See supra Section II.C.  
323 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.  
324 See supra text accompanying notes 90-95.  
325 See supra text accompanying notes 78-84.  
326 See MAYHEW, supra note 34, at 14-19, 96, 203, 239-40 (discussing congressional 
power to shape, as well as reflect, public opinion). 
327 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
328 See supra Section II.B.  
329 See supra Section II.C.  
330 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION:  REMARKS ON DIS-
COURSE ETHICS 54-55 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 1993) (describing the conditions for ideal 
deliberation). 
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hancing the overall representativeness of our political institutions, and 
improving the quality of public deliberation. 
B.  The Possibility of Congressional Self-Assertion 
Of course, Congress must show itself willing to use the powers that 
the Constitution gives it.  It is telling that Presidents have long pushed 
claims of executive privilege—which is nowhere mentioned in the 
Constitution331—to the maximum, while the various congressional 
powers surveyed in this Article have largely languished in recent years.  
There are a number of possible reasons for this.  One possibility is ig-
norance:  perhaps legislators simply do not realize the full extent of 
their powers or have not fully grasped the extent to which their choic-
es, in the aggregate, strip their branch of power.  Another possibility is 
that legislators do recognize that they possess these powers, but do not 
consider exercising them to be in their individual interests.  This 
would stem from a disconnect between the institutional interest of 
Congress and the individual interests of its members—it may well be 
in Congress’s interest to strengthen ethics enforcement,332 for exam-
ple, but individual members may balk, either because they find it dis-
tasteful to go after their colleagues or because they fear that their own 
ethical lapses will be discovered.  Likewise, a risk-averse member may 
calculate that the potential risk to her reputation and electoral pro-
spects from disclosing classified information is greater than she would 
like to bear, even if she honestly believes that the public interest 
would be served by disclosure.333  A third, and related, possible expla-
nation for congressional underutilization of its powers is that mem-
bers of Congress are largely unconcerned with congressional power; 
their primary loyalty is to their party, not their branch.334  On this view, 
we should expect to see vigorous interbranch contestation only when 
the branches are controlled by different parties.  Each of these expla-
nations has some explanatory force, and congressional passivity is un-
doubtedly a consequence of all three (and perhaps others as well). 
But this does not mean that congressional passivity is inevitable.  
First, although it is easy (and fashionable) to be cynical about politi-
 
331 See generally RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:  A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 
(1974). 
332 See supra Section II.B.  
333 See supra Section II.A.  
334 The canonical statement of this argument is Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2006).  
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cians’ motives, it is clear that there are always at least some legislators 
who act from a genuine desire to promote the public good.335  Con-
sider the recent example of Senators Wyden and Udall, who disclosed 
that the government had adopted a disturbing secret interpretation of 
provisions of the PATRIOT Act.336  Both are Democrats, as is President 
Obama, so partisan motivations would have counseled silence, rather 
than disclosure.  And there is no particular reason to think that the 
voters of their respective states (Oregon and Colorado) are unusually 
worked up about government data collection, nor is there any other 
reason to think that these particular senators stand to gain from this 
confrontation.  Rather, the best interpretation of their actions is that 
they, like Senator Gravel,337 disclosed the information because they be-
lieved that it was in the public interest to do so. So long as there are 
some members with this outlook on public office—and if there are 
not, the constitutional order is in significant danger338—there will be 
 
335 Richard Fenno has repeatedly stressed that members of Congress pursue good 
public policy as one of their primary goals.  See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN 
IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973) (listing “good public policy” as one of three “basic” goals of 
members); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE:  HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 
157 (1978) (noting that at least some members cultivate support in their districts pre-
cisely in order to have leeway to pursue good policy in Washington); id. at 221-22 (not-
ing that some members are willing to risk losing reelection in their pursuit of good 
policy).  Indeed, even David Mayhew, whose work is often characterized as asserting 
that members single-mindedly pursue reelection, also notes that “[a]nyone can point 
to contemporary congressmen whose public activities are not obviously reducible to 
the electoral explanation.”  DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS:  THE ELECTORAL CONNEC-
TION 16 (2d ed. 2004).  Quantitative work bears out Fenno’s thesis that good policy is 
often a driving force for members’ behavior.  See James E. Campbell, Cosponsoring Legis-
lation in the U.S. Congress, 7 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 415, 418-19 (1982) (finding that a mem-
ber’s ideology is a significant factor in her decision of what bills to cosponsor); John E. 
Owens, Good Public Policy Voting in the U.S. Congress:  An Explanation of Financial Institu-
tions Politics, 43 POL. STUD. 66, 70 (1995) (“The existing literature on the House Bank-
ing Committee shows that most members are motivated more by good public policy 
goals than by reelection or influence in Washington.”); id. at 81 (discussing the results 
of his own study, which “appear to be consistent with the findings of the previous discus-
sion that Banking members’ decision-making responses vary across issue areas, but when 
they decide on most of these issues their conceptions of good public policy are the most 
prominent influences”); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE:  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21 (1991) (noting that Fenno’s view that making 
good public policy is one significant goal of members is “[s]urely closer to reality” than 
views that attempt to reduce their motivations to solely self-interested factors). 
336 See supra text accompanying notes 194-97.  
337 See supra text accompanying notes 171-87.  
338 See Josh Chafetz, The Political Animal and the Ethics of Constitutional Commitment, 
124 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2011), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/ 
chafetz.pdf (arguing that a republican commitment to the public good explains in 
some measure why powerful actors accept political outcomes they do not like). 
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members with an incentive to make vigorous, but judicious, use of the 
congressional powers described in this Article. 
Second, the strongest argument in support of the inevitability of 
congressional passivity, the argument from partisanship, can actually 
be marshaled to support rather than hinder congressional assertive-
ness.  After all, partisan sentiment pushed in favor of a more vigorous 
use of the power of the purse in 2011.339  True, this motivation will  
only come into play under divided government, but the very existence 
of divided government may be a good indication that the branches 
should each be more assertive and confrontational.  Unified govern-
ment means that the American people have, over the course of several 
election cycles and across wide swaths of the country, opted for the 
governing agenda of one party over another.340  In other words, it sug-
gests that one party is more effectively representing our collective self 
in all its complexity341 than the other is.  This does not mean that 
there will be no disagreements within that party, nor does it mean that 
there will not be issues that split both parties.  But it does indicate a 
general, sustained preference for one party’s agenda over the other’s, 
and, in that context, it makes good democratic sense for there to be 
fewer checks on the implementation of that party’s agenda.  Divided 
government, by contrast, indicates that the American people have not 
seen fit to entrust the entirety of governmental operations to a single 
party.  The multiplicity-based separation-of-powers framework pro-
vides institutional homes for both parties under such circumstances, 
and the Constitution provides them with ample powers to use from 
these institutional bases—as this Article has demonstrated in the case 
of Congress.  To the extent, then, that partisanship is a significant mo-
tivating force, it does not indicate the inevitability of congressional 
passivity; rather, it is one factor that goes to the judiciousness of the ex-
ercise of congressional power.  Whether or not a particular use of 
power is judicious is not a question to be answered in the abstract; it 
can be sensibly answered only with reference to particular disputes 
and their political contexts. 
 
339 See supra text accompanying notes 85-95.  
340 See Chafetz, supra note 31, at 1124 n.242 (arguing that unified and divided gov-
ernment are dependent variables and that the relevant independent variable is “the 
preferences of the American people”).  
341 See supra text accompanying notes 310-11 (describing the various overlapping 
components of our collective political self and their institutional manifestations in our 
constitutional order).  
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Indeed, the party structure can also help to overcome potential 
collective-action problems with congressional assertiveness.  The prob-
lem, in brief, is this:  to the extent that presidential assertiveness bene-
fits the executive branch, the President captures nearly all of the ben-
efit; by contrast, to the extent that congressional assertiveness benefits 
Congress, any individual member will capture only a small percentage 
of the benefit.  We would thus expect to see congressional assertive-
ness undersupplied relative to presidential assertiveness.342  But this 
assumes that all members of Congress capture a roughly equal share 
of the benefits.  In fact, however, outsized benefits accrue to party 
leaders in the houses.  Indeed, in moments of high-salience inter-
branch conflict, the potential benefits to, say, the Speaker of the 
House may rival the potential benefits to the President.  (Just ask 
Newt Gingrich or John Boehner.)  And the party leaders will accord-
ingly use what mechanisms of party discipline they possess to bring the 
rank-and-file along with them.  We thus see again how the mecha-
nisms of the party system can enable, rather than inhibit, congression-
al assertiveness. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that party discipline in the United 
States is by no means absolute.  There are familiar stories of members 
of Congress bucking a President of their own party.  Recent examples 
in this vein include Senators Wyden and Udall on the PATRIOT 
Act,343 Senate Republicans’ refusal to confirm Harriet Miers to the Su-
preme Court,344 and Senate Democrats’ refusal to confirm Goodwin 
Liu to the Ninth Circuit or Dawn Johnsen to head the Office of Legal 
Counsel.345  There are also familiar examples in the other direction—
that is, cases in which Congress has failed to assert itself against a Pres-
ident of the opposite party.  Indeed, this Article began with one such 
case study:  the failure of the Democrat-controlled 110th Congress 
 
342 Of course, this problem will be mitigated to the extent that one believes that 
members of Congress pursue their vision of the public good, rather than solely serving 
their individual material interests.  See supra notes 335-38 and accompanying text.  
343 See supra text accompanying note 194-97.  
344 See GREENBURG, supra note 35, at 263-84 (describing the controversy over Pres-
ident Bush’s nomination of Miers, including substantial conservative resistance).  
345 See Charlie Savage, Long After Nomination, an Obama Choice Withdraws, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A16 (noting that the Senate never held a floor vote on John-
sen); Carol J. Williams, Political Logjam on Federal Judgeships, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010, 
at A4 (noting that Liu’s appointment was blocked in the Senate).  Although Democrats 
had a filibuster-proof majority for much of the time that the Johnsen and Liu nomina-
tions were pending, there was enough Democratic opposition to keep them from com-
ing to the floor. 
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vigorously to confront President Bush.346  It is in precisely such a situa-
tion that a more vigorous use of the powers described in this Article 
would be in both Congress’s and the nation’s interests. 
Thus, in the end, the wisdom of any particular assertion of con-
gressional power will be worked out in the discursive relationship be-
tween the houses and their members, on the one hand, and the pub-
lics they represent,347 on the other.  The members must listen to their 
voters, but they must also speak to them, shaping public opinion even 
as they reflect it.  The constitutional mechanisms discussed in this Ar-
ticle provide the houses and members of Congress with potent tools to 
focus public attention, make arguments to the public, and represent 
the views of the public in dealing with the other branches.  To the ex-
tent that we are concerned about the amassing of power by the other 
branches—and many constitutional and political observers clearly 
are348—we should be encouraging Congress to make better use of its 
constitutional powers. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress is our constitutional First Branch, and, although it was 
not meant to be an unchecked sovereign, neither was it meant to play 
third fiddle.  The hard and soft powers discussed in this Article are 
not foreign to our constitutional order—indeed, I have discussed ex-
amples of the use of each of them in American history.  Viewed as a 
group, as components of a larger scheme, they provide Congress with 
significant resources to be used in interbranch conflicts.  The judi-
cious use of this group of powers could go a long way toward restoring 
constitutional equipoise, toward allowing “[a]mbition . . . to counter-
act ambition”349 as a means toward responsible constitutional self-
government. 
 
 
346 See supra text accompanying notes 17-25.  
347 I use “publics” in the plural because, of course, different officeholders answer 
to different constituencies.  To some extent, all members of Congress answer to the 
American people as a whole.  But they also answer to their specific constituents, and a 
Representative from San Francisco will have a different constituency than a representa-
tive from Dallas, and the Senators from California and Texas will have still different 
constituencies, although, of course, the Representatives’ constituencies will be a subset 
of the Senators’ constituencies. 
348 See supra notes 1-2.  
349 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 9, at 322 (James Madison). 
